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DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE, JUNE 1986

ORIGINAL

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 19, 1986

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DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE, JUNE 1986

THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1986

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 2:13 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The meeting will come to order.

Madam Secretary, I've been told that some of the members are on their way, so I think we can get underway.

The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East meets today in open session to hear testimony from Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Hon. Rozanne L. Ridgway.

Since her last appearance before the subcommittee on May 21, the President has announced he will no longer base decisions on strategic forces on United States compliance with Salt II limits. The subcommittee wishes to focus on this issue and its impact on United States-Soviet relations and arms control negotiations.

We also wish to examine Eastern European issues, particularly with regard to MFN status for Romania; the Eastern Mediterranean and the United Nations peace initiative for Cyprus; United States-West European relations, and United States and allied efforts to respond to international terrorism.

I see you have a statement, Madam Secretary. That statement, of course, will be entered into the record in full. I would appreciate you're summarizing that statement, and we'll begin.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROZANNE L. RIDGWAY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. RIDGWAY. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. I will, as you request, begin with a summary of that statement, starting with the review of the President's May 27 decision on interim restraints [1] and proceeding through the agenda for today, as you described it.

First, the interim restraint decision of May 27, as the President, himself, described it, follows an undertaking to go the extra mile to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

He said, at the time, that he would determine future United States actions on a case by case basis, in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own. That was in June 1985.

[1] See appendix 1.

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This May, the President said he had found no real progress toward meeting United States concerns with respect to noncompliance, no abatement of the Soviet strategic force buildup; and that we have yet to see the Soviets follow up constructively on the commitment at Geneva to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations.

The President also noted that he found himself faced with ongoing decisions on United States military plans and programs, and that he had determined that the most essential near term response to the Soviet noncompliance remains the implementation of our full Strategic Modernization Program, and continued pursuit of the SDI Research Program.

A part of that decision was that, for economic reasons, the United States will retire and dismantle two Poseidon submarines this summer, and thus remain technically in observance of Salt II limitations. But the President, at the same time, stated his intention not to dismantle U.S. strategic systems to compensate for the 131st B-52 bomber equipped for cruise missile carriage later this year.

The President said that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the Salt structure, which have been undermined by Soviet noncompliance.

There was, as you know, Mr. Chairman, shortly after the President's decision, the meeting of the NATO foreign ministers in Halifax. At the NATO meeting, the Secretary of State outlined the underlying rationale in terms, which I think are also worth repeating here today.

First, that there is in fact a very strong allied view of the need to maintain a credible deterrent.

The decision is a shift of gears from a form of restraint under a treaty that was never ratified and was being violated, and for that matter, has become increasingly obsolete, to a form of restraint that looks at behavior by the Soviet Union and looks at responsibilities the United States has, and the Alliance has, for maintaining defensive deterrent capability.

The Secretary described the elements of the decision as enhancing mutual restraint; as enhancing the goal of the Geneva negotiations, that is, significant nuclear weapons reductions; as enhancing, in terms of negotiations, the relevance of warheads and throw weight as measures of nuclear power; and as being a responsible United States response to unresolved Soviet arms control agreement violations.

I think it is important to point out statements of the President about what the United States is not going to do. The President said in his May 27th statement:

> I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the Strategic Modernization Program the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

So, as I said earlier, the consequence of the President's decision is to shift gears away from an increasingly obsolete standard of

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limiting increases to a policy which we believe permits us to defend ourselves, deter aggression, and offers a prospect of real mutual restraint at the lowest possible level of forces.

In summary, the President's message is one of restraint and reductions.

I think one cannot go through a review of this decision without taking note of the fact that we do in fact face very serious budgetary constraints, and that there is a question, which has been answered by saying it makes no economic sense for us to tear down effective deterrent systems while the Soviet nuclear buildup continues.

And so, as I said in reading from the President's statement, from now on, United States restraint will be based on the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat. If the Soviets take constructive steps in arms control by the end of the year, the President will take that into account. No decisions have been made on the retention of individual United States systems.

If the Soviets exercise restraint, the President will exercise restraint when we reach the next modernization milestone.

Whether SALT is dead or alive is a word game that misses the real issue. I can assure that for our part, restraint is alive, and we continue to encourage the Soviets also to exercise restraint and to take constructive arms control steps.

I thought that, today, Mr. Chairman, it might be useful to include in my review of things that have occurred since my last appearance here, some quick review of the status of negotiations across the board, where we are engaged with the Soviets.

In Geneva, since the beginning of the year, the Soviets have made a number of arms control proposals. By and large, they've done little to resolve the concrete obstacles that have kept us from achieving progress at the Geneva negotiations.

Recently, however, the Soviets have made several proposals responding to our moves of last November and February. I'd like to say, today, that we are studying these proposals seriously, and weighing them very carefully to determine whether they build on areas of convergence and help to move the negotiations forward.

Until our analysis is complete, I don't want to characterize the proposals in any way, either negatively or positively, and I'm sure you will understand that it's important, as we conduct this serious study, that we preserve the confidentiality that is necessary if we are to move forward.

But we do want to determine whether the Soviet moves lead toward an agreement that meets the standards we've all agreed on, one that's effectively verifiable, one that provides for deep reductions, and one that promotes greater strategic stability.

In my prepared testimony, there's a small review of where we are in START, INF and the Defense and Space Negotiating Group. I think it's worthwhile to mention MBFR and CDE. In MBFR, NATO, the NATO countries in a December move, adopted the basic framework for agreement that was proposed by the East last year, so that we are now negotiating from the same script.

We dropped the long-standing requirement for data agreement on Eastern force levels prior to reductions, which the Soviets long-claimed to be the main barrier to agreement. And so you can un-

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derstand our disappointment that, although we had taken these important steps, the Eastern response to that merely resurfaced old provisions, with no progress on verification issues.

The CDE talks in Stockholm, of course, are intended to lead to negotiated verifiable confidence building and security measures. We want, as a general objective, to require all states with European military activities to notify other states that they will be having exercises, and to invite observers, and we're asking for an exchange of calendars of planned activities a year in advance. But here, too, the crux of the matter is verification.

Today, it's difficult for me to tell you what Stockholm's prospects are. I would simply say that the negotiations continue, and the conference adjourns September 19.

There is also on the table a call from General Secretary Gorbachev for substantial reductions in ground and air forces of European states and relevant United States-Canadian forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. NATO foreign ministers in Halifax themselves reaffirmed their goal of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, and commissioned a task force to address the Warsaw Pact proposal which, only last week, emerged following what General Secretary Gorbachev had had to say.

So there is some work going on in that area.

In the CW, chemical warfare, chemical weapons negotiations going on in Geneva, we are pressing the Soviets for a substantive response to our proposals on, again, key verification issues, particularly challenge inspection. The Soviet Union has a purely voluntary approach on challenge inspection, quite in contrast with the views that most of the CD members have on the need for a stringent obligation to accept inspection.

There has been a further exchange with the Soviet Union on this, and we welcome the elaboration that emerged from the exchange, but the details still need to be ironed out, and of course, verification issues addressed.

With respect to the broader United States-Soviet agenda, since the Summit there's been some progress in the bilateral area. The Soviets have taken several welcome steps on humanitarian cases, although that has been in highly selective areas of their overall very deficient record on human rights.

The exchanges on regional issues have continued, although we still have no sign of Soviet readiness to seek negotiated solutions to regional conflicts that continue to damage East-West relations.

The prospects for a summit, again, I think we can see from the public record, all of us, that the Soviets have reaffirmed their interest in a 1986 summit to which they agreed in Geneva, but we still don't have a date. Nor do we have a date for the meeting between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz, which was postponed from its place on the calendar in the middle of May.

And we don't have, as a result, talking about ministerial meetings, any steps then taken to live up to the commitment to have a regular, and a more regular, more frequent dialog between foreign ministers.

We are proceeding on the assumption that a 1986 summit will be held as we and the Soviet Union agreed at Geneva.

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In your opening of this session, Mr. Chairman, you indicated the committee's interest in the Romania MFN decision. I can just say that the President has submitted his determination to Congress, he did that on June 3, that MFN trade status be renewed for Romania, Hungary, and the People's Republic of China.

As our own discussion between myself and your subcommittee has demonstrated in the course of these preceding months, the decision to renew MFN for Romania was a difficult one, but on balance, it was the finding that our interests are served by renewal. The President determined that there was substantial emigration from Romania, which was the criterion established by Jackson-Vanik, and that in a relationship which includes MFN, we can have some modest influence generally over Romanian human rights performance.

Berlin has come onto the agenda since our last setting or last meeting. On May 26, the German Democratic Republic attempted to impose new controls at the sector line, which divides Berlin, and I can summarize what has transpired since May 26 by saying that the allies, the allied powers of Berlin, acting in concert across the breadth of NATO, have persisted in their position that the GDR does not have competence in this area; that we look to the Soviet Union to take the necessary steps. The result of all of the efforts on the part of everyone concerned was that, at least as of today, it would appear that the situation is returning to essentially the status quo ante.

Spanish security negotiations, the Secretary and the Spanish Foreign Minister met on May 27, as part of the annual meeting of the United States-Spanish Council.

It was a good session, and the principal outcome of that meeting was agreement to begin negotiations for renewing our bilateral basing rights agreements in Madrid on July 10.

You asked, also, Mr. Chairman, about Cyprus.

The state of play there is that the Turkish Cypriots have accepted the U.N. Secretary General's latest draft framework agreement. The Greek Cypriots have not accepted the agreement, and they've called for an international conference or a Cypriot summit meeting to resolve the toughest issues before they will assess the draft framework.

The Secretary General has said that since one side is not yet in a position to accept the draft framework agreement, the way is not yet opened to proceed with the negotiations that he has proposed for an overall solution. And he added that, under the circumstances, the way forward will require careful reflection by all concerned.

We continue to believe that, as I have testified previously, that the Secretary General's approach offers the most realistic path to the initiation of negotiations between the two Cypriot sides on the outstanding issues, and we are urging the parties, as I today, again, would urge the parties, to work constructively with the U.N. Secretary General to get a negotiating process on track.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that is the summary of my statement, and a bit of an anticipation on your interest in Cyprus.

[Ms. Ridgway's prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROZANNE L. RIDGWAY

Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased to accept your invitation to appear today to discuss recent developments in U.S.-European relations, in particular the President's May 27 decision on interim restraint, and the prospects for strategic nuclear arms control. I will begin with a review of that decision, but I want also to take this opportunity to review the totality of our agenda -- arms control, bilateral relations, human rights, regional issues -- with the Soviet Union.

Interim Restraint

First, the interim restraint decision of May 27, as the President himself described it, follows an undertaking by the President in June 1985:

> "... to go the extra mile, dismantling a Poseidon submarine ... to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their non-compliance, reversing their unwarranted military build-up, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements."

By this May, the President said in announcing his decision, that he found "no real progress toward meeting U.S. concerns with respect to the general pattern of non-compliance...;" "no

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abatement of the Soviet strategic force build-up; and that we have yet to see the Soviets follow up constructively on the commitment made by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations..."

At the same time, the President went on to say, he has found himself faced with ongoing decisions on U.S. military plans and programs, and determined that

> "... the most essential near-term response to Soviet non-compliance remains the implementation of our full strategic modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our Allies."

As one step in implementing the U.S. strategic modernization program, the President said he had directed acceleration of the Advanced Cruise Missile program. Although he announced that for economic reasons the U.S. will retire and dismantle two Poseidon submarines this summer, and thus remain technically in observance of SALT II limitations, he also stated his intention not to dismantle U.S. strategic systems to compensate for the 131st B-52 bomber equipped for cruise missile carriage, when late this year we again run up against a theoretical SALT II limitation. As the President explained on May 27:

> "... in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on

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> the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet non-compliance, and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union."

In addressing the President's May 27 decision a few days later for our European allies and for the U.S. press at the NATO Ministerial in Halifax, Secretary Shultz outlined the underlying rationale in these terms:

-- the very strong Allied view of the need to maintain a credible deterrent;

-- a "shift of gears from a form of restraint under a treaty that was never ratified and was being violated, and for that matter has become increasingly obsolete ... to a form of restraint that looks at behavior by the Soviet Union and looks at responsibilities that the United States has and the Alliance has, for the maintenance of our defensive deterrent capability."

The Secretary described the elements of the decision as enhancing:

-- mutual restraint, not interim restraint;

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-- the goal of the Geneva negotiations -- significant nuclear weapons reductions -- not the continuing increases allowed under SALT II;

-- the relevance of warheads and throw weight as measures of deliverable nuclear power, not launchers, the primary unit of account of SALT II;

-- a responsible U.S. response to unresolved Soviet arms control agreement violations.

The Secretary pointed to flat statements of the President in his May 27 statement about what we would not do:

> "I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union."

The consequence of the President's decision is to shift gears away from an increasingly obsolete standard of limiting increases to a policy which permits us to defend ourselves, deter Soviet aggression, and offer the prospect of real mutual restraint at the lowest possible level of forces. The President's message is one of restraint and reductions.

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In addition, we face very serious budgetary constraints, and it makes no economic sense for us to tear down effective deterrent systems while the Soviet nuclear buildup continues. For example, the Soviets have gone from about 5000 to about 9000 warheads under SALT II.

From now on, U.S. restraint will be based on the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat. If the Soviets take constructive steps in arms control by the end of the year, the President will take that into account. No decisions have been made on the retention of individual U.S. systems. If the Soviets exercise restraint, the President will exercise restraint when we reach the next modernization milestone. But, if the President should decide to dismantle strategic systems, it will be as a result of his assessment of U.S. national security in the light of what the Soviets do, and not because of an obsolete limit.

Whether SALT is dead or alive is a word game that misses the real issue. I can assure you that, for our part, restraint is alive. We continue to encourage the Soviets also to exercise restraint and take constructive arms control steps.

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NST Talks

I would like to take this occasion to see where we are across the range of arms control negotiations with the Soviets.

Since the beginning of the year, the Soviets have made a number of arms control proposals. By and large, these proposals have done little to resolve the concrete obstacles that have impeded progress at the Geneva negotiations. Recently, however, the Soviets have made several proposals responding to our moves of last November and February.

We are studying these proposals seriously, and weighing them carefully to determine whether they build on areas of convergence and help to move the negotiations forward. Until our analysis is complete, I do not want to characterize the proposals in any way, either negatively or positively. It is also important that we preserve the confidentiality that is necessary if we are to move forward.

We will want to determine whether the Soviet moves lead toward an agreement that meets our standards -- one that is effectively verifiable, that provides for deep reductions, and which promotes greater strategic stability.

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In START, we seek deep and stabilizing reductions, particularly in ballistic missile warheads and throw weight.

In the INF framework, our goal remains the total elimination of all U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles, but we are also ready to negotiate on the basis of our November proposal, which would provide for an interim agreement greatly reducing these missiles on a global basis. An INF agreement must take account of the threat that we and our allies face from SS-20s deployed in Soviet Asia. A U.S.-Soviet agreement cannot contain constraints on British and French nuclear forces, and an agreement must restrict short range INF so it cannot be increased to substitute for LRINF.

In the Defense and Space Negotiating Group, we continue to press for serious discussion of ways that greater reliance on strategic defense can enhance stability.

MBFR & CDE

In MBFR, NATO's December move made several major concessions in order to break the 13 year deadlock in the Vienna talks. It adopted the basic framework for agreement proposed by the East last year; so we are now negotiating from the same script. It also dropped the longstanding requirement

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for data agreement on Eastern force levels prior to reductions, which the Soviets have long claimed to be the main barrier to agreement.

We are thus disappointed that, in disregard of these important steps, the Eastern response merely resurfaced old, unacceptable provisions from previous proposals, with no progress on key verification issues. Despite Gorbachev's January 15 commitment to accept reasonable monitoring in MBFR, the Soviets continued to insist on purely voluntary on-site inspection, and even backtracked on some verification measures.

The purpose of the CDE talks in Stockholm is to negotiate verifiable Confidence Building and Security Measures. These won't control arms or limit their use. The U.S./NATO goal is to establish a regime to increase transparency in European military activities. We want to require all states with European military activities to notify other states that they will be having exercises, and to invite observers. We are also asking for an exchange of calendars of planned activities one year in advance.

But the crux of the matter is verification, especially of questions raised by unannounced military activities. It would be worse to have an unverifiable set of CSBMs from Stockholm

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than no concluding document. Today, it is difficult to tell what Stockholm's prospects are. The Conference adjourns September 19.

In a more sweeping approach to conventional arms control in Europe, on April 18 Gorbachev called for substantial reductions in ground and air forces of European states, and relevant U.S. and Canadian forces, from the Atlantic to the Urals. Reduced units would be disbanded, and armaments would be destroyed or returned to national territory. June 11 Warsaw Pact elaboration called for alliance-to-alliance cuts of 100,000-150,000 on each side within a year or two, followed by further cuts in ground and tactical air forces to about 25% below current levels by the early 1990's.

At last month's NATO meeting in Halifax, Alliance Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their goal of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels.

To work urgently towards the achievement of this goal, NATO ministers set up a high level task force on conventional arms

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control. The work of that group will address the recent Warsaw Pact proposal.

CW Negotiations

In the chemical weapons ban negotiations in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament we are pressing for a substantive Soviet response to our proposals on key verification issues, particularly challenge inspection. Moscow's purely voluntary approach on challenge inspection contrasts with the majority of CD members' views on the need for a stringent obligation to accept inspection. On April 22, Soviets fleshed out Gorbachev's earlier remarks on CW production facilities, including the systematic on-site inspection of their destruction. We welcomed this elaboration, but details need to be ironed out and other key verification issues addressed.

Broader U.S. Soviet Agenda

The President commented upon his return from Geneva last November that U.S.-Soviet relations seemed to be headed in the right direction, but that there would be hard work ahead.

Since the summit, there has been some progress in the bilateral area. The Soviets have taken several welcome steps

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on humanitarian cases, although in highly selected areas of their very deficient overall record on human rights. Our exchanges on regional issues have continued, although we still see no sign of Soviet readiness to seek negotiated solutions to regional conflicts that continue to damage East-West relations. Progress on arms control as I have outlined has been disappointing, especially in light of the agreement at the summit to accelerate the work of the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva.

Prospects for A Summit

The Soviets have reaffirmed their interest in a 1986 summit, to which they agreed at Geneva, but have yet to provide the date. Moreover, the Soviets have so far declined to hold a meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, despite their commitment at the Geneva summit to a regular dialogue between the foreign ministers.

We continue to believe that a summit in the U.S. this year, and meetings between the foreign ministers to prepare for it, could foster progress on the whole spectrum of the U.S.-Soviet agenda: arms control, regional questions, human rights, and bilateral issues. We are proceeding on the assumption that the 1986 summit will be held, as the Soviet Union and we agreed at Geneva.

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Romanian MFN Decision

The President, under the terms of the 1974 Trade Act, submitted a determination to Congress on June 3 that MFN trade status be renewed for Romania, Hungary, and the People's Republic of China.

As the President stated in his message to Congress, and as Counselor Derwinski testified on June 10 to the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on International Trade, the decision to renew MFN for Romania was a difficult one but, on balance, our interests are served by renewal. The President determined that there was substantial emigration from Romania -- the criterion established by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment -- and that, in a relationship which includes MFN, we can have some modest influence generally over Romanian human rights performance. Recent releases of political and religious activists from prison, and announcement of a general amnesty for political prisoners, are examples of this influence.

We are concerned about keeping faith with the several thousand Romanian citizens who have declared a desire to emigrate to the United States and are qualified, under U.S. law, to come here. We also are determined to exert whatever influence we can to moderate Romanian abuses of human rights in

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other areas, particularly in the area of religious expression. As bad as the Romanian record in this area is, we judge that it would become even worse if we abandon the one tool that has provided us with some leverage.

Controls at Berlin Sector Crossing Points

On May 26 the GDR attempted to impose new controls at the sector line which divides Berlin. What the GDR wanted to do was to control the passports of diplomats who live in East Berlin as they cross into the West, and to demand visas of diplomats who live in West Berlin as they cross into the East on day trips. In both cases, this would have constituted a change in the existing situation in Berlin and was a clear attempt to erode further the principle of free circulation in Greater Berlin.

We regard Berlin as one city under Four Power administration. We take the view the GDR has no competence for matters affecting Berlin and we have never recognized GDR efforts to transform the sector line in Berlin into an international border. We maintain the principle of freedom of circulation within Greater Berlin and we adhere to the principle contained in the Quadripartite Agreement that changes in the existing situation in the city can only be made with the

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agreement of the four powers, the U.S., the UK, France, and the Soviet Union.

Now, the key to dealing successfully with this kind of thing is united action by the Western countries. I am happy to report that Western solidarity in resisting the GDR attempt has been very good. Western diplomats in East Berlin have refused to surrender their passports to GDR guards at sector crossing points and they and their families have put up with considerable inconvenience in temporarily losing easy access to West Berlin. They have had to make a very long circuitous trip around the city to a recognized international crossing point, which is particularly difficult for individuals who work in the West and for children who go to school there.

At the NATO Ministerial meeting in Halifax the British, French and American Foreign Ministers agreed on a course of action which resulted in approaches to the Soviets, both in Berlin and in Moscow. A number of other Western governments also voiced objections to the GDR and the Soviets.

The result of our efforts was that the GDR very quickly rescinded its new demands for British, French and American diplomats in East Berlin. We continued our efforts on behalf of those countries which were maintaining solidarity with us.

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So, the GDR then announced that the measures it had declared earlier had been "temporary," and that new tamper-proof diplomatic ID cards would be issued to diplomats in East Berlin for use in crossing into the West. These new cards are being issued this week and we will watch very carefully to insure that they constitute a return to the status quo ante.

We are not completely out of the woods yet. There remains the question of the GDR attempt to demand visas from diplomats in West Berlin going on day trips into the East. As necessary we will continue our approaches to the Soviets in conjunction with our allies.

Spanish Security Negotiations

Secretary Shultz and Spanish Foreign Minister Fernandez Ordonez co-chaired the annual meeting of the U.S.-Spanish Council in Washington on May 27. They had friendly, productive private discussions over lunch and during a private meeting. The main outcome of the meeting was agreement to begin negotiations for renewing our bilateral basing rights agreement in Madrid on July 10. In accordance with a Joint Statement issued in Madrid last December, the negotiations will also address the phased reduction of the U.S. military presence in Spain, "based on the assumption by the Spanish armed forces of specific responsibilities and missions currently undertaken by U.S. forces in Spain, while maintaining the overall defensive capabilities and level of security for both countries and their allies."

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U.S. POLICY ON THE SALT II AGREEMENT

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, very much.

Let's begin with SALT II. Can you state for us, as precisely as you can, what your understanding of U.S. policy is now on SALT II?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Well, I have just gone through it. Is there something I——

Mr. HAMILTON. I'd just like to hear you state it.

Ms. RIDGWAY. That the United States, following the interim restraint decision of the President in June 1985, went the extra step and tried to engage the Soviets in meaningful progress on negotiations, a reversal of violations, a slowdown in the buildup.

And the President at that time said that he would keep the issue under review. He did keep it under review and in May of this year, concluded that in order to meet the responsibilities of the United States for its own defense and the defense of NATO, to keep the deterrent strong and credible, that in the future, the United States would be guided, not by the framework of SALT II, but rather by a measure of the Soviet military posture.

It is, as I said, a shifting of gears away from a standard which sought to limit increases, to a standard more consistent with the President's objective, which has been to obtain reductions.

WAY A CHANGE IN THE SALT II POLICY

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, the administration has followed a certain policy with regard to SALT II for 5 years, or almost 6. It now changes that policy, or as you say, shifts gears. What has happened to bring about the shift? Why change policy on SALT, now?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I think that, first of all, we have a record as a nation of having an incredible amount of patience. It is not new that there has not been Soviet compliance in certain areas; that there have been violations. The response was not to act immediately; to ourselves, say, all right, with these violations, the obligation on the United States has been lifted, but rather to say, let's try to get those violations corrected, let's talk to the Soviet Union about the buildup. Let's get engaged in negotiations on reductions.

Let's also, however, remind ourselves that we must proceed with the Strategic Modernization Program. And I think that a great deal of time was given to the effort to persuade the Soviet Union to understand the points that we were making about the need to join us in a truly mutual effort. You may say, why 5 years? It could have been 4; it could have been 6. It is 5 because this is the point in fact at which the United States also is making important decisions about a Strategic Modernization Program. It certainly is true that this was the spring in which decisions had to be made regarding new systems. And one of the items that I mentioned in my testimony had to do with budget constraints and the very real impact on the American posture of starting to discard systems that were more modern and were essential to us at a time when there had been no response from the Soviets to the President's June 1985 posture.

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U.S. ADHERENCE TO SALT II LIMITS

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, is it then your intention to exceed the SALT II limits, unless the Soviets take certain steps in the near term to address your concerns?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I would like, if you'll permit me, to make sure that I am exactly precise in answering this, because what we are talking about is new systems coming on line and old systems being removed.

The final decision on retention of individual U.S. systems has not been made. If the Soviets exercise restraint and other constructive steps, the President will exercise restraint when the next modernization milestone is reached. If the President should decide to dismantle something, it will be as a result of his assessment of United States national security in the light of what the Soviets do, and not because of some historic number.

Mr. HAMILTON. But, at this point, must the Soviets take some positive step in the near term in order to prevent you from exceeding the SALT limits?

Ms. RIDGWAY. We have called upon the Soviet Union to exercise restraint, and we have always had before us a set of concerns, not only with respect to compliance or the rate at which they were building up, but also a concern about what was going on in the negotiations in Geneva and whether those were proceeding, so there's a range of things that might be taken——

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me proceed.

Can you be explicit about what action you would expect the Soviets to take or to avoid taking that would enable the United States to defer exceeding the limits?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I cannot give you, if what you have in mind is a specific list, I cannot give you that specific list of things beyond what we have said throughout, that the violations have concerned us. Some are irreversible, the SS-25 is probably irreversible, but the Soviet compliance record is troublesome and we see no steps to bring themselves into compliance with what we had seen as SALT II.

The buildup rate continues. The pace and substance of the Geneva negotiations would be an element, but I could not go beyond saying those are the three areas: their performance under the SALT II interim restraint no undercut policy; their own rate of military expenditure and the expansion, for example, on warheads from 5,000 at the time SALT II was initialed, to 9,000 now, to a capacity to go up to some 11,000 or 12,000; and what is happening in the Geneva negotiations—those three areas.

Mr. HAMILTON. Would you anticipate that a third Poseidon submarine will be dismantled as Ambassador Nitze has suggested?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I must have missed what Ambassador Nitze said, but I could not speak to what the decision would be on that.

RELEVANCY OF SALT II

Mr. HAMILTON. At the bottom of page 2 of the President's statement, it says we will base our decision on the nature of Soviet strategic forces and on the threat posed by the Soviets. Now, that statement makes no reference at all to SALT II. Can I take it, from

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what you state and what I have read, that SALT II now has really become irrelevant?

Ms. RIDGWAY. It certainly is not part of the switching gears to searching for a regime headed toward reductions, and with respect to the posture of the United States looking not to SALT II numbers, but to the threat posed by strategic forces. So, my problem with the word, irrelevant, Mr. Chairman, is that people have spent a lot of time, lately, talking about dead or alive, relevant or irrelevant. And we've been trying to get the discussion over onto the question of how does the United States take care of its own strategic modernization, the deterrent posture of itself and the alliance, and a set of standards that reflect what the Soviets are doing and the desire to reduce.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, in moving the language and focus that way, by shifting gears, as you put it, you shift away totally from SALT II. You don't mention SALT II, and the President doesn't mention SALT II.

Ms. RIDGWAY. That's right.

Mr. HAMILTON. So, then, I draw the conclusion SALT II is irrelevant or dead.

Ms. RIDGWAY. We say it's history. Don't know where the difference is in there, Mr. Chairman, but we see it as history.

Mr. HAMILTON. You would not agree that it's irrelevant?

Ms. RIDGWAY. We are technically still in compliance with SALT II, so it certainly is not, at the time I'm sitting here, irrelevant.

Mr. HAMILTON. And it's not dead?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I say, I like to say that what we have in its place is a new standard and you could get a very, very long discussion as to whether it was ever alive except as a voluntary framework.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Feighan.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. I beg your pardon, Mr. Feighan. I made a mistake. Mr. Torricelli is first. I beg your pardon.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADHERENCE TO SALT II SUBLIMITS

Doesn't the announcement on the SALT Treaty that we would exercise some restraint in making a commitment not to surpass the Soviets in delivery vehicles extend to the sublimits currently in the SALT treaty, or is that reference simply to the total number of warheads or launch vehicles?

I don't understand the nature of the President's commitment not to surpass the Soviets.

Ms. RIDGWAY. If you'll allow me to just put the reservation on that I would be—some expert may correct me when I get back and say I got it wrong, it is my understanding that it refers to all of the limits above major limits——

Mr. TORRICELLI. So we are dealing only with the gross number?

Ms. RIDGWAY. No, the large and the small.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Because of the importance, let me just probe this further.

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Do we reserve the right to exceed Soviet numbers for example, in submarine launched missiles, but we retain a commitment that our overall number of delivery systems would be lower than the Soviets'?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Oh, I'm sorry. I did misunderstand your question. I read that to mean that we are not going to exceed Soviet numbers on warheads, I believe the statement was, and on delivery systems. That was not——

Mr. TORRICELLI. Including in the individual components, submarine-launched ICBM's, intermediate range, and bomber delivered?

Ms. RIDGWAY. It is not clear, and I don't feel that I can answer you without misinforming you. I'd be happy to even try to get it while we are sitting here, but I'm just——

Mr. TORRICELLI. I'm not sure that there even is an answer to the question. That's one of the reasons I'm asking it.

Ms. RIDGWAY. I'm not aware that it has been taken up in that kind of detail. It is, as you point out, a statement simply would not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than those of the Soviet Union. I take that as gross.

Mr. TORRICELLI. OK.

Ms. RIDGWAY. We would not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union. Again, I take that as gross.

SALT II AND THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Mr. TORRICELLI. Very often, as is a part of our mutual business, we ask questions because we want to hear the questions and not necessarily the answers. I state that now, because I genuinely would like your answer to this question, because I've heard so many people speak, particularly today, on both sides of this issue.

My concern relates to the compliance question and the issues before the Standing Consultative Commission regarding the SALT Treaty. Somebody must be wrong, because I have heard people say both that we have gone to that Commission with exhaustive presentations of Soviet violations, and that we have not done so.

I've heard it said that we have given instructions to our representatives to seek answers, and I've also heard it said that we've gone merely to complain, rather than engage in a real dialog for answering those concerns.

On each of the three principal issues about which we are charging violations the SS-25, the phased-array radar, and the encryption issues have we specifically gone to the Soviets with each of those issues with a detailed complaint of the nature of their violations, and sought explanations and a resolution of the issues?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Mr. Torricelli, I'm going to have to confess that your question, for which you do want a detailed answer, is one I can't provide you the detailed answer on, because, while I know that all three of the issues have been raised with the Soviet Union across a variety of forms, and I have also been present when it has been raised, you have, later on in your question, a desire for information about what exactly was the American complaint. How did we put it forward and what was technically——

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Mr. TORRICELLI. I have no doubt that we have made the accusation of a violation. My concern is whether we have made a genuine and detailed attempt at resolution of the conflict.

Ms. RIDGWAY. But you asked also within the SCC, and there, I just don't have the record of the SCC. I am, myself, satisfied that we have, in all three of these cases, and I have been present when it has happened throughout, for example, all of the preparations that were a bilateral dialog between the United States and the Soviet Union leading up to the Geneva summit, I have been present when these things have been discussed.

In each case, the charge is rejected.

CURRENT LEVEL OF EMIGRATION FROM ROMANIA

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, if you'll permit me just two final questions?

To move to the question of Romania: Could you give me some indication of the current level of emigration from Romania? I concur with the administration's judgment about most-favored-nation status, and have done so in the belief that there is some real progress being made in emigration from the country.

I seek your assurance that my instincts were right in believing the administration took the right action.

Ms. RIDGWAY. Your instincts are right, Mr. Congressman. The figures for 1986 are going to at least equal the 1985 rate. In recent weeks, the Romanian Government has agreed to issue emigration passports to over 1,100 people who are qualified to come to the United States.

I do not have with me today the figures for other countries, for example, the Federal Republic, but we are at the levels that were achieved as we have instituted this relationship to include MFN. The struggle for the decision is one that we have all seen coming, as we then, however, look at the overall picture in Romania, and find that we have only the most modest influence on other aspects of the relationships that are of interest to us, for example, on human rights.

But even there, in the course of the dialog, very intensive dialog, that we have had this Spring, as we have said to the Romanian Government, you must be watching this exchange in the American public policy sector as we struggle with this, and you failed to respond to these legitimate concerns of the United States.

We have finally come to the position where, and then only recently, the Romanian Government agreed to release several very important symbolic religious and political activists from prison, names that are well-known to the subcommittee, Constantin Sfateu, Dorel Catarama, and others, and there was a very much larger number released under terms of an amnesty on June 2.

Mr. TORRICELLI. So the overall levels are at least steady?

Ms. RIDGWAY. The emigration levels are at least steady, and, I think, in the new, in the expanded area of our concern, not directly related to emigration, Jackson-Vanik MFN, but to our overall concern with the situation in Romania, I think we are showing that we can exercise some modest influence; not easily, but we can.

And that record, I think, is better.

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U.N. FRAMEWORK FOR A CYPRUS SOLUTION

Mr. TORRICELLI. Finally, on Cyprus. What now?

Is there now, or do you anticipate, a continued effort by the Secretary General at the current level of activity? Shall we anticipate a new proposal? Does the failure to achieve some accord, based on the Secretary General's actions, now invite a different role for the United States?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I don't think to start with. First, I don't think there is a different role to be played by the United States. I think it is essential that we continue to support and to show our support for the U.N. Secretary General.

This framework approach is one in which you attempt to address all of the questions and resolve those that you can and devise agreed formulas for how you would subsequently, but still within the framework, address these really tough things. I think that's really the only way to go and the only hope we have of making progress.

The difficulty has been that the Greek Cypriots, as they have expressed to me and others they have met in Washington, and I have met at various meetings around the world, find it difficult, at the present time, to accept the latest Secretary General's framework and we've been urging them to accept it and to get on with it, recognizing that nothing is final until everything is final.

That phrase, I think, is very important and perhaps it needs some thinking about as both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities ask where are we going, because for both of them, it's a tough issue. I think that the Greek Cypriots, as a result of their consultations around the world with us, elsewhere, are still considering what their final response to the Secretary General will be.

We have not seen that final response. We know that they have problems with it; they haven't rejected the draft framework agreement, neither have they accepted it. Our hope is that after they study it some more, that they would come back to the Secretary General and say that the agreement is acceptable granted that it has all of the following problems, instead of the other way around, which it has all of these problems, and therefore, we want to go off on another tangent.

Mr. TORRICELLI. That would represent a significant change from how their response now appears?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Right. That's right. But I think that their own interests are to be found there, and that final answer hasn't come in. They are back home thinking about it, and I know they are consulting, and it continues to be our hope. To repeat, our role, I think, is to continue to be firm in expressing the view that we have taken from the beginning, that this is about the only framework that offers any hope of success.

I certainly don't see any other way, and I don't think that these proposals to step aside from the framework and go to an international conference or high-level summit meeting outside the framework will get us where I'm sure both sides want to go. There is a place for the summitry, for example, in the Secretary General's framework farther down the line.

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Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Feighan.

EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON SALT II

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Ridgway, I'd like to ask you with respect to the reaction of some of our European allies in the President's announcement of his intention to not meet the limitations of SALT II, the administration must have been disappointed but certainly not surprised by the reaction of some of our allies.

How would you characterize the posture of our more critical allies in Europe, now, toward that decision?

Ms. RIDGWAY. We did have an extensive round of consultations, I'm sure you saw pieces of it as people traveled around in the spring, a refund of consultations that was going on through the beginning of the decisionmaking process, on through the end of it. The allies did express their views and they have been expressing them.

They had supported the President's June 1985 interim restraint decision, and they were aware that it explicitly conditioned continued United States restraint on reciprocal Soviet behavior.

I think that it is clear that many of the allies have a different point of view, but what is common among us, is the concern for a deterrent and the need for reductions. But we are a democratic alliance, as I think, the Secretary said at a press conference in Halifax, after the conclusion of the NATO foreign ministers meeting, where, obviously, this was discussed.

We always get together to discuss these things, and it's in the nature of our alliance and the democracies that we represent, that there may be differences of view, but then, people begin to understand.

My own experience, Mr. Feighan, has been that these arguments or points or considerations or elements that I have laid out with you today, have prompted a great deal of thinking.

US-NATO CONSULTATIONS ON DISMANTLING POSEIDON SUBMARINES

Mr. FEIGHAN. Did we consult specifically with our NATO allies with respect to the decision to dismantle two Poseidon submarines?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. And then, did we consult specifically on the decision to abandon the limitations on SALT?

Ms. RIDGWAY. All of those were consulted with and they went through several stages, as good consultations do. First a review of the issue, then a review of all of the choices, and then a review of emerging decisions, and then informing them what the decision was.

Mr. FEIGHAN. And then would notification have gone to our allies with respect to the most recent decision?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I can't give you specifics, but it was before the decision was made public.

Mr. FEIGHAN. OK. If I can turn——

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Ms. RIDGWAY. And I should add, because I think I hear it in there, with time enough to answer if they had wanted to.

U.N. FRAMEWORK FOR A CYPRUS SOLUTION

Mr. FEIGHAN. If I could turn to the issue of Cyprus, and I appreciate the fact that you made some preliminary comments in your opening remarks, because it remains such a difficult issue and one that is such an irritant for us in our policy in that region of the Mediterranean.

I thought I heard you say that this seems to be the only framework that could result in a resolution, or at least the beginnings of a resolution of the problem, although there was a prior framework that we seem to embrace, too, which was the last draft.

And that really now gets to the heart of what the problem is. I think we all believe, and I think all of us on this committee, and the administration, are encouraged that we are probably closer to a settlement, the beginnings of an accord, on the problem on Cyprus than ever before in recent years.

That's very exciting. It seems so tenuous at this point. One of the major problems is at least it appears the Greek Cypriots perceive the most recent agreement as substantially fundamentally different than the second draft, or the former accord that had been proposed.

And do I characterize that correctly by saying that the fundamental difference that they perceive is that concerns that they have are proposed to be addressed in the most recent accord after the accord is signed, but the accord previous to this, which the Greek Cypriots seemed willing to accept, would have resolved some of those issues, particularly with respect to resettlement, withdrawal of Turkish troops, before an accord would have been signed?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Mr. Feighan, that is not my understanding of the framework process. When I said that we take a look at, that we consider the framework as the best possible thing we have going for us at the moment, what I meant to incorporate in the framework was this years' long exchange, now, going back and forth.

It is the Secretary General providing an instrument for the exchange of ideas across the range of issues, so that what happened in January, April, August, and now this spring, are not themselves a succession of agreements that represent solutions, but rather, one or several in a series of documents that we haven't yet seen the end of, as the Secretary General helps the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots make their way through issues.

And I make this point because you talked of agreements reached last year, which seem, and the Greek Cypriots have made the point very clear, which they think there was some slippage on this year. The concept is that nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to, but you have papers going back and forth that keep attempting to get to a broader and broader number of issues attempting to narrow the differences between the two.

It isn't that the agreement last year said, well we will get to settlements and things of that sort, in a different fashion than this year. They are treated the same. From the moment the Secretary General started out some 2 years ago, to put all of this together,

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those three issues have always been in the same place: To be settled in time, within the context of all of the myriad items to be settled.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Well, that, if I might interject, Madam Secretary, that is not, from my understanding, a fair characterization.

Ms. RIDGWAY. OK.

Mr. FEIGHAN. That, in fact, the agreement that the Greek Cypriots had accepted, at least in an informal sense, last year, would have provided for certain mechanisms of agreement on critical issues that are not provided for in this agreement, but that are relegated to sort of working groups that don't even speak to at what level they might be—but let's not get bogged down in that detail.

Rather than us maintaining the position, because we seem to have such a rare opportunity, here, to play such a constructive role in resolving what has been a major problem for us, rather than taking the posture that we should only urge the Greek Cypriots to accept this document, shouldn't we consider one of two alternatives, one of many, but two that come to mind.

One might be some variation on a proposal for an international conference, or summit, that might not be quite as broad in scope as the Greek Cypriots would contemplate but would get it off of the center that its stalled at right now. Or urging the Secretary General to incorporate an accompanying document or statement of intent and purpose which did accompany the last document, but does not accompany this.

Would either one of those avenues seem to give us an opportunity to move it off dead center?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I wouldn't preclude anything, you know, that has the hope of moving things off dead center. Certainly, on the question of summits and working groups, and as you say, probably wise for all of us who want to move forward on this issue not to get bogged down in detail. But there is in the draft agreement an outline for an overall settlement and a place for summits and working level groups on all of these issues.

I don't mean to imply that we have spoken only to the Greek Cypriots as if they, alone, bear full responsibility for resolving this whole very important question for all of us. But in the current situation, where we are trying to make sure that the Secretary General's initiative isn't lost, we are in fact encouraging the Greek Cypriots to find a way of replying to him, so that the framework stays alive, and he can take into account, then, some of the kinds of things that they have said they are concerned about.

POLICY OF NOT RECOGNIZING THE FEDERATED TURKISH STATE OF NORTHERN CYPRUS

Mr. FEIGHAN. Let me ask just one final question that I think you can answer with a "yes" or a "no."

Are we committed to not recognizing, do we remain and intend to remain committed to not giving any recognition to the declared federated Turkish State of Cyprus?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Absolutely.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you.

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Mr. HAMILTON. The Chair would just like to acknowledge that we have in our audience this afternoon, several members of the European Parliament. We're delighted to have them here. We hope they have a good stay here, and a good trip.

I know they're going to Santa Fe this weekend with Mr. Gilman and others, and we are very pleased they've had an opportunity to stop by the hearing this afternoon.

Mr. Gilman.

STATUS OF THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to join in welcoming our European colleagues to our meeting, and it's an appropriate hearing that they are sitting in on, as Secretary Ridgway reviews issues relating Europe.

Secretary Ridgway, to pursue the Cyprus issue just a moment more, are we in a position, now, where one side has accepted some of the proposals, and the other side has not, or can you spell that out a little more clearly?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I would say that we are in a position in which the Turkish Cypriots have accepted the Secretary General's latest draft framework agreement, to be precise about what is before the two parties. The Greek Cypriots have not accepted the agreement. They've called for an international conference or a Cypriot summit meeting to resolve the toughest issues before they assess the draft framework.

But that situation is being described as one in which one side has not yet been able to accept the document; it is not being described as rejection.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, Madam Secretary, isn't it true that the Greek Cypriots contend that the Denktash acceptance was a conditional acceptance, with a number of important conditions that were not acceptable to the other side?

Ms. RIDGWAY. That may be their characterization but it is fair. And in fact, I have often thought for myself that one way for the Greek Cypriots to reply which would keep the process alive, would also be to say, "Yes, we can accept this but here are all of the things that are wrong with it that will have to be changed as we go along."

Mr. GILMAN. Well, some Greek Cypriots have underscored the fact that there are a number of conditions in Mr. Denktash's letter of April 21. For example, that the Turkish Army must remain on Cypriot soil, that the Turkish military guarantee in law and in practice is continued and that the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus be accomplished before any withdrawal of Turkish troops and a number of other conditions be met, as well.

Isn't it true that the Greek cypriots have looked at it as a conditional acceptance, rather than a full acceptance, and so they say that they are still at odds with each other over some of the more salient features?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Oh, they absolutely are, yes. Those are key issues.

Mr. GILMAN. What are we doing to try to keep that process going?

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Ms. RIDGWAY. We see it as a process which I suppose all of us who live in this city will recognize as one in which there is a narrowing of differences. The process, the best process that we have seen is the Secretary General's initiatives. I have no doubt that, as we go along, some of the proposals he puts forward will not be accepted by one side, but it stays on the table because it is acceptable to the other, and nothing is final until, you know, nothing is final until everything is final and so you keep everything out there as you go through the issues, and then you resort them and you see what else you have.

And that's what we're trying to keep alive.

Mr. GILMAN. We don't have any mediator out there, do we, or any negotiator?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Well, it really is the Secretary General's initiative, and we have made clear to him that he has our firm support. I have, myself, traveled to New York to make sure that he understands that he has our support, and he is the one with the responsibility at the moment.

EXTENSION OF MFN FOR ROMANIA

Mr. GILMAN. Turning to a moment to Romania, on June 3, the President approved another year-long extension of the most-favored-nation trading status for Romania.

Can you tell us what the basis of that extension was?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes, Mr. Gilman. We have——

Mr. GILMAN. I know there was some criticism just prior to that by the administration with regard to some of the actions by the government of Romania?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes. And we have, ourselves here, in previous occasions, had exchanges about how difficult this kind of decision is to make. But by the end of the year, the emigration figures showed that in fact we were having an effective impact on emigration, and just in recent weeks, the figure I gave in answer to an earlier question, the Romanian Government had agreed to issue an emigration pass for over 1,100 people who are qualified to come to the United States.

Now, some people may say that's rather late, but my answer is, it's 1,100 people.

Mr. GILMAN. Does that bring it up to prior levels of emigration?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes; yes, it does.

And, even on human rights, which is not dealt with in Jackson-Vanik or MFN, and isn't a part of the qualifications for MFN. Even in the area of human rights, on which so many members of the subcommittee have made very clear statements of concern, we have found that we have had a modest degree of influence and so, without wanting to make a judgment on—that exaggerates what is going on, in a positive fashion—what is going on in Romania—we said it continues on balance to serve these two important interests, to go ahead with MFN.

ROMANIAN EMIGRATION

Mr. GILMAN. Can you tell us what the level of immigration is to West Germany and to Israel?

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Ms. RIDGWAY. Thank you, Mr. Gilman, that is exactly the question—I think I said earlier to Mr. Torricelli—I will have to get those numbers for you. I believe that they are still at the same levels, although there has been, I believe I can predict, some decline in the level of immigration to Israel, principally because of the declining size of the community there.

[The information follows:]

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[Levels of Romanian emigration to the FRG and Israel]

Following are statistics on Romanian emigration to the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel:

Year	FRG	Israel*
1/1/86-6/30/86	4,539	486
1985	13,072	1,327
1984	14,831	1,908
1983	13,957	1,331
1982	11,546	1,474
1981	8,619	1,012
1980	12,946	1,061
1979	7,957	976
1978	9,827	1,140
1977	9,237	1,334
1976	2,270	1,989
1975	4,085	c. 2,000

* The Romanian Jewish community census as of December 31, 1985 was 24,691 people.

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June 2, 1986

Romanian Emigration to the United States, Israel, and the Federal Republic of Germany

Year	U.S.	Israel	FRG	Total
1971	360	c. 1,900	2,848	5,108
1972	348	c. 3,000	4,374	7,722
1973	469	c. 4,000	7,577	12,046
1974	407	c. 3,700	8,484	12,591
[Romanian MFN Granted: 1975]				
1975	890	c. 2,000	4,085	6,975
1976	1,021	1,989	2,720	5,730
1977	1,240	1,334	9,237	11,811
1978	1,666	1,140	9,827	12,633
1979	1,552	976	7,957	10,485
1980	2,886	1,061	12,946	16,893
1981	2,352	1,012	8,619	11,983
1982	2,381	1,474	11,546	15,401
1983	3,499	1,331	13,957	18,787
1984	4,545	1,908	14,831	21,284
1985	2,951	1,327	13,072	17,350
1/1/86-5/31/86	717 [1]	405	3,736	[illegible]
Totals, 1/1/75-5/31/86:	25,700	15,957 [2]	112,533	154,190

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Notes.

General: Except for figures for Romanian Jewish emigration to Israel since January 1, 1985, the foregoing statistics represent emigration documents issued by the U.S., Israeli, and FRG Embassies in Bucharest. Statistics for Romanian Jewish emigration since January 1, 1985 represent actual arrivals in Israel.

[1] Since April 11, 1986, the Romanian Government has officially advised us of departure approvals for the U.S. of 1,092 people who are qualified for admission to the U.S., and on whose behalf representations have been made by the American Embassy in Bucharest. Due to time lags between emigration approvals and U.S. visa issuance, these approvals are not yet reflected in U.S. visa statistics.

[2] Romanian Jewish community census as of December 31, 1985 was 24,691 people.

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SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR TROOP REDUCTIONS

Mr. GILMAN. The Soviet Union proposed, on June 11, that the Warsaw Pact and NATO each demobilize up to 150,000 troops in Europe within a year or two. What's your reaction to that proposal?

Ms. RIDGWAY. We had been waiting for that proposal because General Secretary Gorbachev, on April 18, had made some public statements concerning the need to look more boldly at conventional arms, so the NATO foreign ministers in Halifax commissioned the establishment within NATO, under the leadership of the Secretary-General, a conventional arms task force.

And then the NATO ministers said: "and we will take into account the April 18 proposal of General Secretary Gorbachev, knowing ahead of time that the Warsaw Pact, in June, was going to give some details to it. Now that we have the details, we want to factor that into this study that is already taking shape in NATO.

But it would be far too soon, with our just getting organized, to say what responses would be. We simply aren't organized now, across their lines, to take a look at them.

ALLIED REACTION TO MBFR TALKS

Mr. GILMAN. What's the reaction of our allies who were not included in these talks? The MBFR talks?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Well, all of our allies are in the—perhaps the difference is that France is not in the MBFR talks. But France is participating in the NATO study on conventional arms. But there has been no reaction, as I understand the use of the word "reaction."

Mr. GILMAN. And how does the Soviet proposal address the verification question?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Well, that's always left until——

Mr. GILMAN. The end?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Until the end.

Mr. GILMAN. There's just one other——

Ms. RIDGWAY. There's always, I should say—there is, increasingly, the Soviet statement that verification can, of course, be achieved. But the details are something else.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO LIBYA

Mr. GILMAN. With regard to terrorism, can you tell us what progress has been made in following through on the decisions taken by the European Community, in the summit seven, relative to the threat posed by Libya?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes; I'd be happy to. Let me talk about, if I might—and it would be appropriate, Mr. Congressman—the general actions, and then I would be prepared to submit for the record, a review that we, in fact, prepared knowing of the committee's interest from the last time I was up here. It goes country by country.

Mr. GILMAN. With the permission of the——

Mr. HAMILTON. Without objection, it will be entered into the record.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information follows:]

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West European Steps Taken Against Libya

A. General Actions

In January, the EC agreed to ban exports of arms to Libya. On 14 April, the EC agreed to:

-- Reduce the staffs of Libyan diplomatic missions (Libyan People's Bureau)

-- Restrict the travel of Libyan diplomatic personnel

-- Impose stringent visa requirements for all Libyans

-- Refuse to accept any Libyan who had been expelled from another state.

The EC states also agreed to reduce the size of their diplomatic missions in Tripoli and reaffirmed that they will not export arms or other military equipment to Libya.

The West Europeans--with the exception of Greece--have implemented this agreement. In the case of reducing the size

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of their diplomatic missions, many of the West Europeans did not have to take any initiative because the Libyans expelled some of their diplomats and non-diplomatic personnel in retaliation for the Europeans expelling members of the Libyan People's Bureau (LPB).

The West Europeans are also cooperating among one another -- and with us -- on countering terrorism better than heretofore. The EC has established a Working Group on Terrorism to supplement and complement the work of other, previously-existing groups.

The UK, France, West Germany, Italy, and Canada also joined the U.S. and Japan at the Tokyo Summit in issuing a strong statement pledging cooperation to work against terrorism.

B. Individual Countries

UK

Broke diplomatic relations with and banned arms sales to Libya in 1984
Has cut oil imports from Libya
Implemented other EC decisions

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Supported U.S. air strike against Libya

Mrs. Thatcher took lead in Tokyo in working for strong statement on terrorism.

West Germany

Implemented EC decisions

-- Reduced size of People's Bureau by 22 people (of 41)

Limited guarantees of credits

Advised West German nationals to leave Libya

Police and security forces cooperated fully with U.S. in West Berlin.

France

Implemented EC decisions

Prevented attack on U.S. consulate

-- Expelled six Libyans, including two diplomats

Cut trade (one-quarter of what it was in 1983)

Stopped direct import of Libyan oil (still purchasing indirectly)

Supporting Chad vis-a-vis Libya

Warned Libya that an attack against France or other Mediterranean states would lead to French military retaliation.

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Netherlands

Took lead in EC decisions for boycotting sales of weapons, establishing EC Counterterrorism Working Group, and committing EC not to "fill-in" behind U.S. in Libya.

Working diligently to expand European-U.S. cooperation

Implemented EC decisions

(The Benelux countries--the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg--expelled seven of 14 Libyans in Brussels who were accredited to all three countries)

Sharply limited export credits to Libya.

Portugal

Implemented EC decisions

-- Expelled five Libyan members of People's Bureau

-- Restricted travel by members of PB

Italy

Implemented EC decisions

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-- Reduced size of PB by 10 people (of 47) and expelled 37 other Libyan nationals

-- Restricted travel by members of PB

Strongly advised Italian nationals to leave Libya (number reduced from about 15,000 to about 2,000)

Cut arms sales to Libya

In the forefront of warning Libya not to launch further terrorist attacks. (Italy has publicly warned Libya that attacks against Italian soil could bring military retaliation and that Italy could fire first in face of a direct threat).

Turkey

Security forces foiled Libyan terrorist attack against U.S. Officers Club in Ankara. The State Prosecutor brought charges against several Libyans implicated in the incident. Three were members of the PB and were not tried on grounds of diplomatic immunity. All three, and an employee of Libyan Airlines, also charged, have left Turkey.

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The two Libyans accused of attempting to carry out the attack were tried and sentenced to five years in prison.

Canada

There is no Libyan PB in Canada, and Canada does not export arms to Libya. Canada has agreed not to admit persons expelled by other countries for terrorist activities, and it is screening travelers to prevent the arrival of known terrorists.

Politically supported U.S. air strike against Libya

Ended all government support for exports to Libya and banned the export of specialized oil field equipment

Sought to prevent any Canadian nationals from "filling-in" behind U.S. in Libya.

Works closely with U.S. in the International Civil Aviation Organization

Norway

There is no Libyan People's Bureau in Norway, which has had a limited relationship with

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Libya. Norway does not sell arms to Libya and only limited trade.

Norway has reduced the number of Libyan diplomats (resident in Denmark) accredited to it.

Denmark

Implemented EC decisions

-- Reduced staff of Libya People's Bureau from 11 to six

-- Monitoring travel/activities of Libyans remaining in Copenhagen.

Luxembourg

Implemented EC decisions

There is no Libyan People's Bureau or any other Libyan entity in Luxembourg. The Government has reduced the number of Libyans accredited to Luxembourg.

Spain

Implemented EC decisions

-- Expelled 14 Libyans, including a Consul General

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-- Restricted travel by members of People's Bureau

-- Begun to curb arms exports

Broke up Libyan-backed anti-U.S. terrorist group

Cut oil imports from Libya (probably due mainly to market conditions.

Belgium

Implemented EC decisions

-- Reduced size of Libyan PB in Brussels.

Greece

Agreed to EC measures, but has not yet implemented them.

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Ms. RIDGWAY. The general actions. In January of this year, the European Community agreed to ban exports of arms to Libya, and then on April 14 we had a more elaborate set of steps—the EC agreeing to reduce the staffs of the Libyian diplomatic missions, or the People's Bureau's as they're known; to restrict the travel of Libyian diplomatic personnel; to impose very stringent visa requirements on all Libyians; and to refuse to accept any Libyian who had been expelled from another state.

The EC states also agreed to reduce the size of their diplomatic missions in Tripoli, and they reaffirmed that they would not export arms or other military equipment to Libya. And, with the exception of Greece, the Western Europeans have implemented this agreement.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM

There's another feature that I think needs to be mentioned, and that is in the area of cooperation. The West Europeans are also cooperating among one another, and with us, on countering terrorism better than ever before. There's a European Community Working Group on Terrorism, to supplement and complement the work of other previously existing groups; and then some representative states with whom we then meet later in the summit seven forum—the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy—joined Canada, the United States, and Japan at the Tokyo summit, with yet another listing of actions to be taken.

So, that's what the current situation is.

MULTILATERAL INFORMATION SHARING ON TERRORISM

Mr. GILMAN. Has there been an increase in the multilateral information sharing on terrorist threats?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes; I think I could say there has been a very significant increase.

Mr. GILMAN. Including the French, who were having some problems in——

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes; that relationship has been improving in the bilateral contacts. Improving in the area of terrorism.

Mr. GILMAN. That's about the end of my questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

Ms. RIDGWAY. You're welcome, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Secretary, we have a quorum call. The subcommittee will stand in recess while we answer the quorum call, and we'll be back.

[Brief recess.]

PROSPECTS FOR A UNITED STATES-SOVIET SUBMMIT

Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Secretary, can you bring us up-to-date on prospects for a United States-Soviet summit?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I can, along with others, continue to await a—the United States continues to await a response from the Soviet Union with respect to a date for a summit in 1986. And since such a summit would have to be carefully prepared to have a meaningful outcome, we continue to await the replacing on the calendar of the

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postponed meeting between Secretary Schultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. I believe that there will be a summit. It is my hope that there will be one in 1986 and in 1987, as we agreed, but we don't have an answer yet on either of those.

Mr. HAMILTON. There's no date for the foreign minister meeting at this point?

Ms. RIDGWAY. No; for neither meeting.

Mr. HAMILTON. So, the next time they're now scheduled to meet is the U.N. General Assembly session?

Ms. RIDGWAY. That would be the next likely meeting time.

Mr. HAMILTON. One gets the impression, in reading the press, that we are quite prepared to go ahead with the summit and would like to schedule it as quickly as possible. Is that generally correct?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Generally correct. As quickly as possible—assumes as quickly as it is possible, also, to have a well-prepared summit.

FAMILY REUNIFICATION

Mr. HAMILTON. Sure. The Soviet Union announced that 200 Soviet citizens are to be reunited with their families in the United States. Have they departed the Soviet Union now?

Ms. RIDGWAY. No; they have not. The Soviet Union is in the process of notifying each of those families and individuals of the permission to leave and they, in turn, would then begin to get all the documents and apply for exit permission. But that's a process that's familiar to us, and it has been started.

Mr. HAMILTON. Those are divided families, are they?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes, they are divided family cases.

Mr. HAMILTON. Are there a lot more unresolved divided family cases that are not included in this 200 in any way?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I believe I can say, Mr. Chairman, that we have now—between the names that were given to us, and the cases resolved in connection with the summit and this group of names—that we have approached something like two-thirds of the divided family list of names that we have, now being resolved.

BERN HUMAN CONTACTS MEETING

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, the United States did not sign the final document at the Bern Human Contacts meeting, which concluded in May. Why did we not sign that document?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Just a correction.

Mr. HAMILTON. As I understand it—is that not right?

Ms. RIDGWAY. That is correct. The procedure is that there is no voting in the CSCE, so it isn't as if there was a document that 34 others signed and we did not. It follows the well-known rule of consensus, and our position is described as having denied the necessary consensus for a document to be agreed upon. We did it after very careful thought. It was a unanimous decision within the U.S. Government, and within the delegation. It was our belief that the proposals that were included in the document had the very real potential for eroding the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

I would like to give you an example, so that that is a judgment that is more than just words. To the extent that the Helsinki Final Act speaks of principles, it is of broad principles. This was a meet-

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ing on human contacts. The Helsinki Final Act essentially says,"there will be human contacts. People will be allowed to travel, families will be allowed to be reunified." Proposals that we turned down were of the kind that said,"in connection with family travel, persons over age 60 or persons going to 50th wedding anniversaries, and such categories as that, will be given priority."

The more we looked at that, the more we realized that, in effect, it was reducing the strength of the principle. And that is not the direction in which we wish to go. So——

Mr. HAMILTON. Reducing in what sense?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Well, now, the principle would be—not that the people had the right to travel, but the people age 50 had more of a right to travel, or people going to 50th anniversaries had more of a right to travel.

Mr. HAMILTON. And all of our allies disagreed with us?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I think that's unfair, although it is true. In the end, the United States was the one that denied the consensus. I think there were many allies who were quite concerned about, exactly, the principle that we took there, so that there has not been a sense among all of the allies—many allies did disagree with us, but not all of the allies. And we have not faced a great concern that somehow we did the wrong thing.

Mr. HAMILTON. Which allies disagreed with us?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I would say that the allies that——

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, maybe it would be easier to state the question the other way? Which——

Ms. RIDGWAY. No, I think the more constructive way, and the one that illuminates the problem best, is the dialog that we have—the very substantial dialog that we have with the Federal Republic of Germany on this question. Because the Federal Republic of Germany has, on a daily basis, a very real concern about the opportunities for people to travel from the German Democratic Republic.

They have very extensive programs and relationships related to travel, and from their standpoint the risk that a broad principle might be made more narrow is not as great as the loss of an opportunity to make more progress for travel from East Germany. That is, they would, I think, be more inclined than we to accept a proposal that says,"when everybody is traveling, a 50-year-old has more opportunity, or a 60-year-old." And so it's a discussion that we have with them all of the time, and I would say that—as we prepare to go to the Vienna Conference—it is something that the allies are going to have to discuss thoroughly.

Where is the balance between these two views?

Mr. HAMILTON. I'm trying to get an understanding of what happened. Did most of the allies disagree with us, or did most of them agree with us?

Ms. RIDGWAY. No, most disagreed.

Mr. HAMILTON. Most disagreed?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. A few did agree with us?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes.

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UNITED STATES-POLISH RELATIONS

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, let's turn to Poland for just a minute. Former Ambassador Stoessel, visited there recently. What's ahead of us in United States-Polish relations? Is the next move in the relationship their move or our move?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Well, I think it's very likely to be not constructive for either of us if we lay out the relationship in terms of whose move is it, because we could stand around and wait forever because it wasn't clear. And the wrong one didn't have the message.

I think, for example, that we have known now for at least more than a year that Polish undertakings, with respect to political prisoners, have not been realized as we had hoped that they would be. And so we believe that the Polish Government should take steps to release political prisoners.

We have supported the Church Agricultural Project, and we continue to believe that the Polish Government should move forward on that project. At the same time, I think that both sides have been asking themselves whether it is possible to establish a dialog. And, again, it's incumbent I think on both sides to keep the possibility of the search for a constructive dialog before them.

As to where we are now, we see little evidence of willingness on the part of the Jaruzelski government to adopt a policy of genuine national reconciliation vis-a-vis the Polish people. We want a constructive dialog with them. We certainly remain mindful of their importance, and the historic ties. In one respect, there is an answer to the question, "Whose turn is it?" Because we think that this national reconciliation is, and has to continue to be, the condition for dropping the remaining sanctions instituted by the United States against the Polish Government after the imposition of martial law in 1981.

There aren't many left, and not terribly significant, but they're there. We are looking for the steps I've referred to—the release of political prisoners; the economic reforms; the dialog with the church and other significant elements of the Polish society and I've mentioned already the Church Agricultural Program. It is difficult for us—you've mentioned the Stoessel mission which was private but did produce a dialog—it is difficult for us to move forward with what's happening at the moment.

VISIT OF POLISH POLITBURO MEMBER

Mr. HAMILTON. A member of Poland's Politburo, Mr. Czyrek, is coming over. Is that correct?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. And what is the position of the administration? Do you support or oppose that visit?

Ms. RIDGWAY. We certainly have, in our continuing dialog with people up here who are interested in this very important relationship, hoped that it would be possible to find an opportunity for a Polish representative to come here. Perhaps in the same status as Ambassador Stoessel went there. But in our view, given the arrests that have taken place, it's extremely difficult for that kind of visit to have a really productive dialog as an outcome.

Mr. HAMILTON. So you do not support that visit?

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Ms. RIDGWAY. At this time.

CONTINUATON OF UNITED STATES SANCTIONS AGAINST POLAND

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, the present situation is that we're continuing sanctions against Poland. Yet the President has removed the sanctions against the Soviet Union; the President has moved to improve the dialog with the Soviet Union, and he's moved to support exchanges and contacts with the Soviet Union. In that circumstance, why do we continue the sanctions against Poland, while we have removed them with regard to the Soviet Union?

Ms. RIDGWAY. If I can go back, the sanctions were instituted after the imposition of martial law in 1981. Through a course of dialog with the Polish Government, we talked about the lifting of those sanctions as steps were taken that would lead to national reconciliation, and they took steps and we removed some of the sanctions. They took steps and we removed some more of the sanctions. And then everything stopped.

The dialog, in this area, is almost at the midpoint with the Polish Government.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, we've got two very important sanctions—no MFN and no new credits—in place with regard to Poland. But you also have the situation in Romania. You said in your testimony that Romania probably has the worst human rights record in Eastern Europe. But we've got sanctions against Poland, and Poland probably has the most open society in Eastern Europe.

Ms. RIDGWAY. It is a tough one, Mr. Chairman. I don't think that one can compare across countries. I don't deny that I have heard exactly the argument that you're making. As others suggest that somehow we ought to find a way to signal Poland that we're prepared to contribute even more to our part of the dialog about getting to reconciliation. There is a different standard.

Mr. HAMILTON. The Pope favors lifting the sanctions. Cardinal Glemp favors lifting the sanctions. The Government, obviously, favors it. I've been told that Lech Walesa favors lifting the sanctions. Isn't that true?

Ms. RIDGWAY. That's what we've been told also. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. So it's your impression, then, that he does. I've also been told the Polish American Congress in this country favors it. Is that also correct?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Under some circumstances; yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I know you have a tough situation in regard to Poland. Yet, I'd like to see some movement. They do have a party Congress coming up here fairly soon, do they not?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes, they do. In June.

UNITED STATES BASE AGREEMENT WITH TURKEY

Mr. HAMILTON. And let us hope that there's some actions that occur there that give us some reason to move further.

Ms. RIDGWAY. I would share that hope, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Turning our attention to Turkey, and the military agreement with the United States on the bases, is it correct we've not been able to reach an agreement?

Ms. RIDGWAY. That's correct. We have not.

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Mr. HAMILTON. What's the problem?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Still looking at ways to deal with all of the concerns. One, for example, was textiles, but those negotiations I think are having—are beginning to show the kind of an outcome, and perhaps have already reached the kind of an outcome—that's satisfactory to both sides, so that issue is out of the way.

We have been asking, in a very active dialog with Turkey, how we can extend our relationship. I would say that, for all of the lack of apparent movement, a very real and meaningful negotiation is continuing to go on.

Mr. HAMILTON. What do they want, more aid?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. More access to U.S. markets?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Those two things, principally?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes, that's correct.

GREECE'S NONCOOPERATION ON TERRORISM ISSUE

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, why has Greece been so uncooperative on the terrorist issue? Mr. Papandreou said that the U.S. raid against Libya was a terrorist act. They've not expelled any Libyans, although I understand they did expel some students. What is the problem?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I'd first of all like to associate myself with your assessment that what Mr. Papandreou has had to say detracts from what all of us are trying to do internationally and, as a Western group of nations, to get a focused and effective response to international terrorism. We regret the statements that he has made on terrorism and Libya lately, and we've communicated this view to the Greek Government. I suppose one could catalog a list of reasons offered for the Greek Government's view, but we don't share those reasons.

We think that the threat of terrorism to democracies is real, and that there really cannot be any good reason on the side of doing nothing.

Mr. HAMILTON. What are we trying to do to bring Greece around on the issue of terrorism?

Ms. RIDGWAY. There is very little that we can do except to continue to point out their own interest in seeing to it that there is a decline and a defeat of international terrorism. The tools are the tools of persuasion and of suggesting that people draw their own conclusions about the damage to them of a heightened sense of threat from terrorism.

There's nothing much beyond to say the diplomatic persuasion that one can use.

FLOW OF TURKISH SETTLERS TO CYPRUS

Mr. HAMILTON. You detect the interest of the subcommittee members in Cyprus. I'd like to ask a few questions about that. Do we still have an inflow into Cyprus of Turkish settlers?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Let's see if I have an expert who can tell me yes or no on that? I'd have to take the question.

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Mr. HAMILTON. I've been told that there are about 60,000 in occupied Cyprus now, and that 30,000 of them came within the last 18 months. In other words, there has been a very heavy flow of Turkish settlers there. Could you confirm that for me or not?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I will be happy to.

[The information follows:]

During the mid-1970s the Turkish government promoted the emigration of mainlanders to northern Cyprus. Some 20–30,000 mainland Turks settled in northern Cyprus during that period. In the late 1970s the policy to promote emigration appears to have been dropped. Some settlers have also returned to the mainland. There has, however, been seasonal migration of Turkish agricultural workers to and from northern Cyprus. We estimate the current number of Turkish settlers and seasonal workers in northern Cyprus to be in the range of 30–35,000. We have seen no evidence of any recent substantial inflow of mainland emigrants.

UNITED STATES EFFORTS AT A CYPRUS SOLUTION

Mr. HAMILTON. In any event, at this point what are we doing other than supporting the United Nations? Are we trying to persuade the Greek Cypriots to accept the U.N. draft? Are we meeting with the Greek Cypriots on that question?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I certainly have met with them on that, and even most recently with the Foreign Minister of Cyprus. I don't want the record to show that we are trying to tell the Greek Cypriots to accept the draft, as if the reservations that they might have are not legitimate. What we are trying to say is that it should be possible for you, with the reservations that you have, to accept the draft with those reservations and to continue a process in which the reservations would be addressed in the next round.

Mr. HAMILTON. And what do they say to that?

Ms. RIDGWAY. They have taken that question with them. They have not answered it. We have heard many of their arguments that they just—they feel that they would rather have their principal issues addressed now. We have not heard, I hope, the last word from them on this proposed formulation of ours as we talk to them about accepting the draft with their reservations.

Mr. HAMILTON. What are we saying to the Turkish Cypriots at this point? I've heard, for example, that they're contemplating some additional moves.

Ms. RIDGWAY. I have not heard that. The Turkish Cypriots have accepted the draft. They have made other statements about what some of their views are on some of the major issues that remain, and we have suggested to them that it is important that they stay with the process; that they continue to work with the Secretary General; and that they await a reply from the Greek Cypriots before making any more statements.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you agree with the observation of one United Nations official who said, privately, that the United Nations Cyprus dossier is closed?

Ms. RIDGWAY. No, I do not agree with that.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think it's still an ongoing viable operation?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes, I do. And even if it encounters problems which are as dramatic as the one that it's looking at right now, we

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would make every effort—right up to the very last—to continue to give it life.

Mr. HAMILTON. The Secretary General has characterized the Greek Cypriot reply as, "not viable," and as "not feasible." Do you agree with that?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes, in the sense that what he meant was, it didn't give him anything to work with in the context of his initiative. And that's why, in agreeing with him, we have been talking to the Greek Cypriots, meeting with their representatives, urging them to give him the kind of a reply that he could work with, even if it's a "yes, but."

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you have any reason to think the Greek Cypriots will file a "yes, but" kind of an answer?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I'm going to believe that they will until the day that they totally reject it and change the formulation and say, "we do not accept this in any way, shape, or form."

Mr. HAMILTON. Is the Prime Minister of Turkey going to visit Northern Cyprus soon?

Ms. RIDGWAY. It is my understanding that he's going to, yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do we support or oppose that?

Ms. RIDGWAY. The visit is quite unwise.

Mr. HAMILTON. Sorry?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Unwise.

RESIGNATION OF AMBASSADOR WILSON

Mr. HAMILTON. All right. I wanted to ask you a few questions about Ambassador Wilson. What's the status of his resignation?

Ms. RIDGWAY. He has submitted his resignation and it is to be effective mid-July, when he will officially leave his post.

Mr. HAMILTON. So he's still there?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Yes, he is.

Mr. HAMILTON. His trips to Libya, and his contacts with Libyan officals were unauthorized?

Ms. RIDGWAY. They were not authorized.

Mr. HAMILTON. Was there one trip, or more?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I believe there was one, but I—that's how we've been dealing with it. One trip.

Mr. HAMILTON. And was he at any time rebuked or reprimanded?

Ms. RIDGWAY. The Secretary of State discussed the Ambassador's activities with him when the Ambassador was in Washington in February. I have no personal knowledge of the content of their discussion.

Mr. HAMILTON. But, in any sense, there's nothing on record suggesting a rebuke or reprimand?

Ms. RIDGWAY. I believe there is not, but I was not a party to any of that exchange.

Mr. HAMILTON. When will his resignation become effective?

Ms. RIDGWAY. It is my understanding that it becomes effective in mid-July when he leaves his post.

Mr. HAMILTON. Will the Ambassador be in Washington prior to his resignation?

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Ms. RIDGWAY. My understanding is that he will not, but I could be wrong on that.

RESOLUTION OF U.S.-EC TRADE PROBLEMS

Mr. HAMILTON. Can you report to us any particular progress on the United States-European trade problems?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Well, we've narrowed the differences, which I will take as progress. Although I would not say it's progressive to achieve this by putting in place matching reciprocal, nonrestrictive retaliatory measures, but if that's what works, why, that's what we've got at the moment. There remains, however, a discussion between the United States and the Community through the Commission of an American claim for Compensation involving something like 13 million tons of corn and sorghum.

A problem that we think has to be—we know—has to be resolved by July 1. Very active diplomatic work is going on here. Members of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, traveling members of the Commission—I think that we are seeing, as well, a heightened awareness in the political leadership of the Community—both in the council of the Community and in capitals—of the need to turn ourselves inside out to get this resolved in a meaningful fashion by July 1.

EC AND U.S. TRADE RESTRICTIONS

Mr. HAMILTON. Are the restrictions in effect either way now? Are the EC restrictions in effect, or the United States restrictions?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Two sets of restrictions are in effect, but neither has any real impact. And they have been structured in such a way that they will not have impact until one or the other takes a step.

These are what I call nonrestrictive, retaliatory methods are in place.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, what's the importance of the July 1 date? Why that date?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Well, we just picked that date as a reasonable time, from the moment that we were notified by the Commission, of what was going to be the impact on us of Spanish and Portuguese membership, as a reasonable time to negotiate this one, tough issue on the corn and sorghum to Spain.

Mr. HAMILTON. And our retaliatory measures go into effect July 1?

Mr. RIDGWAY. No, the end of—what we think is a reasonable negotiating period—comes into—ends on July 1; and then when steps would be taken is a function of a very elaborate process within our own Government, of the people who meet to make determinations of that kind of——

Mr. HAMILTON. Who's handling these negotiations?

Mr. RIDGWAY. The——

Mr. HAMILTON. In our Government?

Ms. RIDGWAY. Clayton Yeutter. Alan Woods. People from the U.S. Trade Representative's Office.

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Mr. HAMILTON. Well, Madam Secretary, we'll have a few questions for you for the record.[1] We thank you for your appearance this afternoon, and the subcommittee stands adjourned.

Ms. RIDGWAY. Thank you, very much.

[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[1] See appendix 2.

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APPENDIX 1

Presidential Statement on Interim Restraint

On the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in 1982, I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this action, despite my concerns about the flaws inherent in those agreements, to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiations on arms reductions. I made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup.

Last June, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy. I found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain. As I have documented in three detailed reports to the Congress, most recently in December 1985, the Soviet Union, regrettably, has not. I noted last June that the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with their existing arms control commitments increasingly affected our national security. This pattern also raised fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process itself. A country simply cannot be serious about effective arms control unless it is equally serious about compliance.

In spite of the regrettable Soviet record, I concluded last June that it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try, once more, to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursued, with renewed vigor, our objective of deep reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals through the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their non-compliance, reversing their unwarranted military build-up, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

Later this month, the 8th TRIDENT submarine, USS NEVADA, begins sea trials. In accordance with our announced policy, I have assessed our options with respect to that milestone. I have considered Soviet actions since my June 1985 decision, and U.S. and Allied security interests in light of both those actions and our programmatic options. The situation is not encouraging.

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas, there has been no real progress toward meeting U.S. concerns with respect to the general pattern of Soviet non-compliance with major arms control commitments, particularly in those areas of most obvious and direct Soviet non-compliance with the SALT and ABM agreements. The deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) type, continues apace. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing in a manner which impedes verification. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force build-up. Finally, since the November summit, we have yet to see the Soviets follow up constructively on the commitment made by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself to achieve early progress in the Geneva

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negotiations, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF).

Based on Soviet conduct since my June 1985 decision, I can only conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate its readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. At the same time, I have also considered the programmatic options available to the U.S. in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied security.

When I issued guidance on U.S. policy on June 10, 1985, the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near term for altering its planning is modest at best. Our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face. These budgetary conditions make it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

The United States had long planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest POSEIDON submarines when their reactor cores were exhausted. Had I been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two POSEIDON submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, I would have directed that these two POSEIDON submarines not be dismantled, but be overhauled and retained. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities, I have directed their retirement and dismantlement as planned.

As part of the same decision last June, I also announced that we would take appropriate and proportionate responses when needed to protect our own security in the face of continuing Soviet non-compliance. It is my view that certain steps are now required by continued Soviet disregard of their obligations.

Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet noncompliance remains the implementation of our full strategic modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our Allies. The strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive force options. It provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one.

It is absolutely essential that we maintain full support for these programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet noncompliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their noncompliance. And, it would significantly increase the risk to our security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must remain the full implementation of these programs.

Secondly, the development by the Soviet Union of its massive ICBM forces continues to challenge seriously the essential balance which has deterred both conflict and coercion. Last June, I cited the Soviet Union's SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under

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SALT II, as a clear and irreversible violation. With the number of deployed SS-25 mobile ICBMs growing, I now call upon the Congress to restore bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of the U.S. ICBM program. This program should include the full deployment of the 100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs. But it must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future, including the Small ICBM to complement PEACEKEEPER. Therefore, I have directed the Department of Defense to provide to me by November, 1986, an assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program. This assessment will address the basing of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles and specific alternative configurations for the Small ICBM in terms of size, number of warheads, and production rates.

Finally, I have also directed that the Advanced Cruise Missile program be accelerated. This would not direct any increase in the total program procurement at this time, but rather would establish a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

This brings us to the question of the SALT agreements. SALT II was a fundamentally flawed and unratified treaty. Even if ratified, it would have expired on December 31, 1985. When presented to the U.S. Senate in 1979, it was considered by a broad range of critics, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in important provisions. It was, therefore, judged by many to be inimical to genuine arms control, to the security interests of the United States and its allies, and to global stability. The proposed treaty was clearly headed for defeat before my predecessor asked the Senate not to act on it.

The most basic problem with SALT II was that it codified major arms buildups rather than reductions. For example, even though at the time the Treaty was signed in 1979, the U.S. had, and only planned for, 550 MIRVed ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union possessed only about 600, SALT II permitted each side to increase the number of such launchers to 820. It also permitted a build-up to 1,200 MIRVed ballistic launchers (both ICBMs and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, SLBMs) even though the U.S. had only about 1,050 and the Soviet Union had only about 750 when the treaty was signed. It permitted the Soviet Union to retain all of its heavy ballistic missiles. Finally, it limited ballistic missile launchers, not the missiles or the warheads carried by the ballistic missiles. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of each of the 820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits, and from about 7,000 to over 9,000 warheads today. What is worse, given the failure of SALT II to constrain ballistic missile warheads, the number of warheads on Soviet ballistic missiles will continue to grow very significantly, even under the Treaty's limits, in the continued absence of Soviet restraint.

In 1982, on the eve of the START negotiations. I undertook not to undercut existing arms control agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union demonstrated comparable restraint. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union did not exercise comparable restraint, and uncorrected Soviet violations have seriously undermined the SALT structure. Last June, I once again laid out our legitimate concerns but decided to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, not to comply with or abide by a flawed and unratified treaty, but rather to give the Soviet Union one more chance and adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. The Soviet Union has not used the past year for this purpose.

Given this situation, I have determined that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet non-compliance, and especially in a flawed

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SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

Since the United States will retire and dismantle two POSEIDON submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty until the U.S. equips its 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that I have been forced to make, I intend at that time to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Of course, since we will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II Treaty for some months, I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account.

The United States seeks to meet its strategic needs, given the Soviet build-up, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task which faces us. I call on the Soviet Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Finally, I want to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim INF agreement. If the Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve greater stability and a safer world.

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APPENDIX 2

SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND RESPONSES THERETO

I. ARMS CONTROL

A. SALT II

Q: Mr. Perle of the Defense Department said regarding the President's May 27th announcement:

Either the Congress will stand with the Administration or the Congress will stand with the Soviets.

--What does this statement mean?

--Does the Administration stand by this statement or repudiate it?

A: -- I DON'T WANT TO SECOND GUESS HOW SOMEONE ELSE IN THE ADMINISTRATION HAS EXPRESSED HIMSELF ON THE PRESIDENT'S INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY. THE MESSAGE THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS SHOULD BE SENDING TO THE SOVIETS IS THAT WE ARE UNITED IN EXPECTING THEM TO MAKE GOOD ON THEIR PLEDGES FOR EARLY PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL. THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT CONTINUING UNILATERALLY A POLICY OF NOT UNDERCUTTING AN UNRATIFIED AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD HAVE EXPIRED HAD IT BEEN RATIFIED, IS THE BEST WAY TO GET THEM TO DO SO.

Q: The President's statement of May 27 is that the "U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union."

--Is the operating premise here that if the Soviets exercise restraint we will exercise comparable restraint?

--If the Soviets adhere to the sublimits of SALT II, then why is it in the U.S interest to exceed these sublimits?

A: -- WHILE THE US HAS EXERCISED UNILATERAL RESTRAINT FOR SOME TIME, THE SOVIETS HAVE PURSUED A POLICY WHICH HAS YIELDED THEM SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC MILITARY ADVANTAGES. WE ARE CALLING ON THE SOVIETS TO JOIN US

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IN THE CRUCIAL TASK OF ACHIEVING STABILIZING AND EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS, AND HAVE PLEDGED CONTINUING RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE MEANTIME.

-- REGARDING SALT II SUBLIMITS, THE PRESIDENT DECIDED THAT IT MAKES NO SENSE TO DISMANTLE SYSTEMS ON THE BASIS OF AN UNRATIFIED, EXPIRED AGREEMENT WHICH IS NOT BEING HONORED BY THE OTHER PARTY TO THAT AGREEMENT. INSTEAD, THE PRESIDENT HAS DETERMINED THAT WE AND OUR ALLIES MUST BASE STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE DECISIONS ON THE NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE SOVIET THREAT, NOT ON THE SALT PROVISIONS.

Q: Prior to the May 27th announcement, several in the Executive branch had argued that trying to stay within the limits imposed by SALT II was in our national interest because if those restraints were removed and more missile building were to occur, the Soviets would have a distinct advantage. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in particular had argued that the Soviets have assembly lines in operation today for their latest intercontinental weapons and we do not and it would take considerable time and money appropriated by Congress to reopen production lines.

--What do you say to this argument now?

--If it was valid in April, why isn't it today?

--Why is it in our national interest to take the short term risks inherent in removing the restraints imposed by SALT II?

A: -- THE SOVIETS ENORMOUSLY INCREASED THEIR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES UNDER SALT II AND THEY COULD INCREASE THEM EVEN FURTHER WHETHER OR NOT SALT II REMAINED IN EFFECT. THEY COULD ALSO ADD EVEN MORE WEAPONS IN AN UNCONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE WHAT PRACTICAL PURPOSE SUCH FURTHER EXPANSION COULD SERVE, GIVEN THE MASSIVE BUILDUP THEY HAVE ALREADY UNDERTAKEN, AND COULD HAVE TAKEN IN THE FUTURE UNDER SALT II

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Q: What do you see as the military significance of each of these Soviet violations of SALT II?

--Does the SS-25 constitute a militarily significant improvement in the Soviet missile force?

--Do you see instances of Soviet noncompliance with SALT II as a gray area of treaty interpretation, or as a case of a clear Soviet effort to break out of the SALT II treaty?

A: -- SOVIET ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS HAVE IMPORTANT MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. SOME CAN CONFER REAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES, PARTICULARLY CUMULATIVELY AND OVER TIME. OTHERS CAN ACQUIRE MILITARY IMPORTANCE IF THEY ARE ALLOWED TO BECOME PRECEDENTS.

-- TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-25 VIOLATES THE SALT II PROVISION ALLOWING EACH SIDE ONLY ONE NEW TYPE OF ICBM. THIS WAS A CENTRAL PROVISION OF SALT II AND IT HAD AN IMPORTANT PURPOSE--TO LIMIT THE GROWTH OF ICBM CAPABILITIES.

-- THE SALT TREATIES AND THE POLITICAL COMMITMENTS THEY INVOLVE ARE CLEAR. SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE RAISES SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR COMMITMENT TO GENUINE ARMS CONTROL.

Q: In your testimony in January 1986 before this subcommittee you said that it would have serious consequences on the Geneva talks if we were to abandon the SALT II Treaty.

-- Do you still hold this view?

-- How does the President's decision on SALT II enhance the arms talks in Geneva?

-- Will those arms talks now be more difficult?

-- Does the May 27th decision mean we might as well fold up our tents in Geneva and go home?

A: -- THE PRESIDENT'S JUNE 1985 INTERIM RESTRAINT DECISION MADE CLEAR THAT CONTINUED U.S. RESTRAINT WAS CONDITIONED ON RECIPROCAL SOVIET BEHAVIOR, INCLUDING WORKING WITH US TO

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ACHIEVE REAL PROGRESS IN THE GENEVA NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS. THE PRESIDENT TOOK SOVIET ACTIONS IN GENEVA INTO ACCOUNT WHEN HE MADE HIS MAY 27 DECISION.

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS CALLED FOR THE SOVIETS TO JOIN US IN A TRULY MUTUAL INTERIM RESTRAINT REGIME, BUT HE HAS ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT A POLICY OF INTERIM RESTRAINT IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR AN AGREEMENT ON DEEP, EQUITABLE, AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS. AS THE PRESIDENT POINTED OUT IN HIS MAY 27 DECISION, THE U.S. SEEKS REAL REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS RATHER THAN THE SALT-SANCTIONED GROWTH IN NUCLEAR WARHEADS. ACHIEVING SUCH REDUCTIONS HAS RECEIVED, AND CONTINUES TO RECEIVE, OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY.

-- WE HOPE THAT OUR INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY WILL PUT THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS ON A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE FOUNDATION AND WILL MAKE THE BEST USE OF THE PROMISE PROVIDED BY THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. INDEED, THE SOVIETS HAVE INTRODUCED NEW PROPOSALS IN GENEVA, FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION, WHICH APPEAR TO ALLOW FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION. IF THE SOVIETS ALSO GENUINELY WANT PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING DEEP REDUCTIONS, THEN THIS COULD REPRESENT A TURNING POINT IN OUR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE GREATER STABILITY AND A SAFER WORLD.

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B. The Geneva Talks

Q: What is your view of the Soviet proposal put forward in Geneva that ties deep reductions in strategic weapons to a 15 to 20 year extension of the ABM Treaty?

-- Do you see this as a significant shift in the Soviet position?

-- It has been the view of this Administration to support deep cuts in strategic arms, and it has been the policy of this Administration to date to adhere to the ABM Treaty.

-- Can you build on these elements in the Soviet proposal?

-- What specifically do you object to in this Soviet proposal?

A: -- THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID THAT THE RECENT SOVIET PROPOSALS IN GENEVA HAVE MERIT. ALTHOUGH THEY CANNOT BE ACCEPTED WITHOUT CHANGE, IT APPEARS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN TO MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT. I AM NOT AT LIBERTY AT THIS POINT TO PROVIDE DETAILS ON THOSE PROPOSALS, IN VIEW OF THE NEED TO PRESERVE NEGOTIATING CONFIDENTIALITY. HOWEVER, SINCE CONGRESS OBVIOUSLY HAS THE RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY TO BE INFORMED, WE HAVE CONTINUED TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL OBSERVER GROUPS.

Q: Do you support a time-definite extension of the ABM Treaty as proposed by the Soviets?

--Will anticipated SDI tests soon bump up against ABM Treaty limits?

-- What is your response to the charge leveled by critics that the Aministration's new legal interpretation of the ABM Treaty, its constant reference to the Krasnoyarsk radar as a Soviet treaty violation and its interest in unrestricted SDI testing mean that a decision by the U.S. to abrogate the ABM Treaty is just around the corner?

A: -- THE ABM TREATY IS A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT OF UNLIMITED DURATION TO WHICH THE US REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED. THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO KEEP THE US STRICTLY WITHIN ABM TREATY LIMITATIONS.

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Q: On June 11 the Soviet Union presented a proposal for reducing strategic nuclear arms which would be less extensive than the 50 per cent cut previously proposed, but would exclude U.S. forward-based systems based in Europe.

--Does the Soviet proposal exclude all U.S. forward-based systems, both land-based and carrier-based?

--What is your view of this Soviet proposal?

--The Soviets reportedly requested a freeze on the level of these systems.

--Is that acceptable?

--Does the Soviet proposal meet a long-standing U.S. objective, to exclude these systems from the counting rules for strategic nuclear forces?

--How is this proposal related to the Soviet proposal on deep cuts and an extension of the ABM Treaty?

A: -- IN VIEW OF THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO DISCUSS SOVIET MOVES IN THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS IN DETAIL. THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID THAT THE NEW SOVIET IDEAS APPEAR SERIOUS AND THAT WE WILL STUDY THEM CLOSELY.

Q. The Soviet Union also proposed on June 11 that the Warsaw Pact and NATO each demobilize up to 150,000 troops in Europe within a year or two.

-- What is your reaction to this proposal?

A. -- THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL OF JUNE 11 IS AN ELABORATION OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ON APRIL 18, WHICH CALLED FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN GROUND AND AIR FORCES FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS AND THE RELEVANT U.S. AND CANADIAN FORCES. THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSED INITIAL REDUCTIONS IN AN ALLIANCE-TO-ALLIANCE FRAMEWORK OF 100,000 TO 150,000 TROOPS ON EACH SIDE WITHIN A YEAR OR TWO, WHICH COULD BE FOLLOWED BY A FURTHER REDUCTION OF GROUND AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES TO

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ABOUT 25 PERCENT BELOW CURRENT LEVELS BY THE EARLY 1990'S.

-- AT THEIR MAY 30TH MEETING IN HALIFAX, NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THEIR OBJECTIVE OF STRENGTHENING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AND SET UP A HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL TO WORK URGENTLY TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE. THE WORK OF THE TASK FORCE, WHICH BEGAN ON JUNE 23 AT NATO, WILL TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT AND, OF COURSE ANY ELABORATION, SUCH AS THAT ISSUED BY THE WARSAW PACT ON JUNE 11.

-- IT IS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF THE TASK FORCE STUDY. I CAN ASSURE YOU, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO ANY CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL WHICH COULD INCREASE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

-- How does this proposal address the troop-counting problem, which has been the heart of the problem in the MBFR talks?

A. -- THE JUNE 11 WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL DOES NOT ADDRESS THIS TROOP COUNTING OR DATA ISSUE. BUT IT IS LIKELY THAT AS IN THE MBFR TALKS, THE SOVIETS WILL CLAIM THAT A ROUGH PARITY ALREADY EXISTS BETWEEN NATO AND PACT FORCES. THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT AND PACT PROPOSAL IGNORE THE THREAT TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EUROPE POSED BY THE GROSS IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN FAVOR OF THE EAST AND SEEK TO PRESERVE THE EXISTING IMBALANCE. IN COMMENTARY FOLLOWING THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT, THE SOVIETS CLARIFIED THAT THE REDUCTIONS MUST BE IMPLEMENTED WITH THE CONSTANT PRESERVATION OF THE EXISTING BALANCE IN THE AREA OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE. SIMILARLY, THE PACT PROPOSAL IS BASED ON REDUCTIONS BY EQUAL NUMBERS OR PERCENTAGES.

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-- How does this Soviet proposal address the verification question?

A. -- THERE HAS BEEN A CONSIDERABLE DISPARITY BETWEEN SOVIET PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THIS SCORE AND THE CONCRETE DETAILS TABLED DURING NEGOTIATIONS, AS IN THE MBFR TALKS. GORBACHEV'S APRIL 18 STATEMENT CALLS FOR "DEPENDABLE VERIFICATION" AND THE WARSAW PACT'S JUNE 11 PROPOSAL STATES THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY "RELIABLE AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION."

-- THE MEASURES OUTLINED IN THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, APPEAR TO FALL FAR SHORT OF WHAT THE WEST CONSIDERS ESSENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE. IN THE MBFR TALKS, THE WEST HAS IDENTIFIED KEY REQUIREMENTS SUCH AS ON-SITE INSPECTION AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. IN MBFR, HOWEVER, THE EAST CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT THE INSPECTED SIDE HAVE THE RIGHT TO VETO ANY INSPECTION REQUESTS. ONE WOULD SUSPECT THAT THE FORMULATION OF "ON-SITE INSPECTION, IF NECESSARY," USED IN BOTH THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT AND WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE THE SAME SORT OF ESCAPE MECHANISM.

-- What is your view of the extension of the area for troop reduction in the Soviet proposal for troop reductions "from the Atlantic to the Urals" instead of Central Europe in the previous MBFR negotiations?

-- What would be the reaction of U.S. allies whose forces currently are not included in the MBFR talks?

A. -- FIRST OF ALL, IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECALL THAT THE MBFR TALKS ARE FOCUSSED ON THE THREATENING PREDOMINANCE OF SOVIET FORCES ON THE CENTRAL FRONT. FOR PURPOSES OF ILLUSTRATION, THE SOVIET UNION CURRENTLY MAINTAINS MORE DIVISIONS IN EAST GERMANY THAN ALL THE ALLIED DIVISIONS THAT LANDED IN NORMANDY ON D-DAY. REDRESSING THIS THREATENING SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE A KEY WESTERN OBJECTIVE IN ANY CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION.

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-- SECONDLY, ONE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT THE IDEA OF SEEKING TO IMPROVE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS, ORIGINATED IN THE WEST AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION AGREED TO IT RELUCTANTLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MADRID CSCE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE WELCOME THE SOVIETS' REAFFIRMATION OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO THIS CONCEPT.

-- THE QUESTION OF GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE FOR REDUCTIONS IS ONE OF THE ISSUES WHICH WILL BE ADDRESSED BY THE NATO HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE IN THE COURSE OF ITS WORK. IT WOULD THUS BE PREMATURE FOR ME TO COMMENT ON THAT, OR TO SPECULATE ON ALLIED VIEWS.

-- Is this proposal a Soviet effort to divert attention from the NATO proposal of December, to which the Soviets reportedly have not responded in detail?

A. -- THE SOVIETS HAVE FAILED TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO NATO'S DECEMBER 5 PROPOSAL IN MBFR, WHICH MADE A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS IN RESPONSE TO STATED SOVIET CONCERNS. IN PARTICULAR, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BUDGED AN INCH WITH RESPECT TO THEIR PREVIOUS POSITIONS ON KEY VERIFICATION ISSUES, AND INDEED HAVE EVEN BACKTRACKED ON SOME ASPECTS.

-- IT IS THUS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS HOPED THEIR RECENT INITIATIVES WOULD DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THEIR FAILURE THUS FAR TO PROVIDE A SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE

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RESPONSE TO NATO'S PROPOSAL. NEVERTHELESS, THE ALLIANCE FULLY INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE EAST FOR SUCH A RESPONSE WHEN THE MBFR TALKS RESUME ON SEPTEMBER 25, AND THUS TEST THE SERIOUSNESS OF MOSCOW'S COMMITMENT TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD GREATER CONVENTIONAL SECURITY IN EUROPE.

II. U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Q: Defense Secretary Weinberger invited his Soviet counterpart, Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov, to visit the United States this year.

--What is the purpose of this meeting, and why has the U.S. extended this invitation at this time?

--Have you had any response from the Soviets to this invitation?

A: -- AT THE GENEVA SUMMIT, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AGREED THAT AN INTENSIFIED DIALOGUE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, INCLUDING REGULAR MEETINGS BETWEEN HEADS OF MINISTRIES, COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESS OF ACHIEVING BETTER UNDERSTANDING. SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S INVITATION TO SOKOLOV WAS EXTENDED IN THAT SPIRIT. WE HAVE NOT AS YET RECEIVED A RESPONSE.

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III. EASTERN EUROPE

A. Romania

Q. Your semi-annual human rights report [i.e., Semi-Annual Report on Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act] says that "officially tolerated religious activity in Romania is restricted to the 14 denominations officially recognized by the Romanian Government."

-- What problems are encountered by the 14 recognized denominations?

A. -- AS A MATTER OF RECORD, FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF THE FOURTEEN DENOMINATIONS LEGALLY ACCEPTED IN ROMANIA. INFORMAL ESTIMATES OF NUMBERS OF ADHERENTS ARE GIVEN IN PARENTHESES:

THE ROMANIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH (c. 17,000,000);
THE OLD RITE CHRISTIAN (LIPPOVAN) CHURCH (c. 25,000);
THE HUNGARIAN REFORMED CHURCH (over 1,000,000);
THE AUGSBURG CONFESSION EVANGELICAL (LUTHERAN) CHURCH (c. 160,000);
THE SYNODAL PRESBYTERIAN EVANGELICAL (LUTHERAN) CHURCH (no estimate available);
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH (c. 1,500,000);
THE UNITARIAN CHURCH (c. 80,000);
THE JEWISH FAITH (c. 25,000);
THE GREGORIAN ARMENIAN CHURCH (c. 3,000);
THE MOSLEM FAITH (c. 50,000);
THE BAPTIST CHURCH (c. 200,000);
THE SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH (c. 150,000);
THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH OF GOD (PENTECOSTAL CHURCH) (c. 150,000);
CHRISTIANS ACCORDING TO THE EVANGELIST ("OPEN BRETHREN") (c. 50,000).

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IS LEGALLY ACCEPTED AND FUNCTIONS OPENLY, IT LACKS, UNLIKE THE OTHER GROUPS, AN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT DEFINING ITS STATUS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE COUNTRY. WHILE THE BAPTIST AND 7TH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCHES IN ROMANIA ARE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED, THERE ARE FAIRLY SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF "UNOFFICIAL" BAPTISTS AND LESSER NUMBERS OF REFORMED 7TH DAY ADVENTISTS IN

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ROMANIA WHOSE ACTIVITIES ARE NOT LEGALLY SANCTIONED.

-- AS THE PRESIDENT STATED IN HIS JUNE 3, 1986 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EXTENSION OF MFN FOR ROMANIA, HUNGARY, AND THE PRC, THE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH PREPARATION OF A SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ON RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS IN ROMANIA, AND THE FIRST REPORT, FORTHCOMING IN DECEMBER 1986, WILL EXPLORE THE ISSUES IN FULLER DETAIL.

-- IN THE INTEREST OF BREVITY, WE WOULD COMMENT FOR NOW THAT THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT'S TREATMENT OF EACH OF THE RECOGNIZED DENOMINATIONS HAS EVOLVED SEPARATELY AND DIFFERENTLY, ALTHOUGH ALL ARE SUBJECT TO LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IN ROMANIA WHICH ARE ADMINISTERED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS. DUE TO THE DIFFERENT NATURE OF THE VARIOUS RELIGIONS, THE IMPACT OF THESE REGULATIONS IS UNEVEN: FOR EXAMPLE, RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTATION OR DOMESTIC PRINTING OF BIBLES AND RELIGIOUS MATERIALS HAVE MORE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR SO-CALLED "BIBLIO-CENTRIC" RELIGIOUS GROUPS, SUCH AS THE BAPTISTS, PENTECOSTALS, AND 7TH DAY ADVENTISTS, THAN ON ROMANIAN ORTHODOX BELIEVERS.

-- BROADLY SPEAKING, ALL OF THE FOURTEEN RECOGNIZED DENOMINATIONS EXPERIENCE DIFFICULTIES WITH OFFICIAL RESTRICTIONS ON CHURCH CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR, SEMINARY ADMISSIONS, AND PRINTING OR IMPORTATION OF BIBLES AND RELIGIOUS MATERIALS. ALSO BROADLY SPEAKING, THESE PROBLEMS HAVE WEIGHED LESS HEAVILY ON THE ROMANIAN ORTHODOX AND JEWS.

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Q. What per cent of religious activity in Romania is represented by the Seventh Day Adventists, Evangelical Brethren, Pentecostals, Church of the Nazarene, and other religious groups which fall outside the scope of the 14 officially recognized denominations in Romania?

A. -- AS NOTED, THE SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS, EVANGELICAL BRETHREN, AND PENTECOSTALS ARE OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED DENOMINATIONS.

-- IT IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE THE EXTENT OF ROMANIA'S UNRECOGNIZED DENOMINATIONS. FOLLOWING ARE ROUGH ESTIMATES:

BYZANTINE RITE CATHOLICS (UNIATES): c.1,000,000;
LORD'S ARMY: c. 500,000;
"UNOFFICIAL" BAPTISTS: c. 20,000-30,000;
REFORMED 7TH DAY ADVENTISTS: UNDER 10,000;
APOSTOLIC CHRISTIANS (NAZARENES): c. 2,000;
JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: 2-3,000;
MORMONS: UNDER 1,000;
CHRISTIAN SCIENTISTS: UNDER 1,000.

-- ADHERENTS TO UNRECOGNIZED RELIGIOUS GROUPS THUS REPRESENT SOMETHING UNDER 8 PERCENT OF THE ROMANIAN POPULATION OF 23.2 MILLION. MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNRECOGNIZED FUNDAMENTALIST PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONS AMOUNTS TO UNDER 1 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION.

-- THE "LORD'S ARMY," NOTED ABOVE, IS A FUNDAMENTALIST OFFSHOOT OF ROMANIAN ORTHODOXY. THE BYZANTINE RITE CATHOLIC, OR UNIATE, CHURCH WAS LEGALLY MERGED WITH THE ROMANIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN 1948. LARGE NUMBERS OF ROMANIAN UNIATES HAVE NOT CONVERTED TO ROMANIAN ORTHODOXY OR TO THE LATIN RITE CATHOLIC CHURCH, AND CONTINUE TO PRACTICE THEIR BELIEFS WITHOUT OFFICIAL AUTHORIZATION.

Q. What is the nature of the problem for these non-recognized religious groups?

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A. -- THESE GROUPS FACE THREE BASIC PROBLEMS: AN HISTORIC PROBLEM, THEIR OWN RECENT GROWTH, AND OFFICIAL EFFORTS TO DISCOURAGE THAT GROWTH.

-- FUNDAMENTALIST PROTESTANT GROUPS ARE, WE BELIEVE, GROWING MORE RAPIDLY IN ROMANIA THAN ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE. THESE GROUPS ARE EVANGELICAL IN NATURE: THEY PROSELYTIZE -- SOMETIMES AGGRESSIVELY -- TO ATTACT CONVERTS FROM OTHER ESTABLISHED FAITHS. THEY ARE, ON THE WHOLE, MORE "BIBLIO-CENTRIC" THAN OTHER FAITHS. THESE FACTORS PARTICULARLY BRING THEM INTO CONFLICT WITH THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT.

-- IN ANOTHER SENSE, THESE GROUPS ARE EXPERIENCING A BURDEN OF HISTORY. THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION OF THE 16TH-18TH CENTURIES HAD RELATIVELY MINOR IMPACT IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND CURRENT RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN ROMANIA, INCLUDING THE GROWTH OF PROTESTANT GROUPS, IN SOME WAYS REFLECT MUCH EARLIER DEVELOPMENTS ELSEWHERE.

-- AT THE FUNCTIONAL LEVEL, THEIR PROBLEM IS SERIOUS RESTRICTIONS ON AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES FOR USE AS PLACES OF WORSHIP, AVAILABILITY OF RELIGIOUS MATERIALS, AND TRAINING AND FUNCTIONING OF CLERGY. AS NOTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S JUNE 3 REPORT TO CONGRESS, THERE HAVE BEEN EIGHT CASES IN RECENT YEARS OF DEMOLITION OF FUNDAMENTALIST PROTESTANT PLACES OF WORSHIP OVER ALLEGED "BUILDING-CODE VIOLATIONS," REFLECTING THE AUTHORITIES' INTEREST IN RESTRAINING THE GROWTH OF PROTESTANT FUNDAMENTALISM AND CURBING LOCAL CONGREGATIONS WHICH HAVE GROWN MORE RAPIDLY OR ASSUMED A MORE PROMINENT ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY THAN THE AUTHORITIES WOULD LIKE.

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-- WE DEPLORE RESTRICTIONS. WE MUST ALSO NOTE THAT THEY ARE LIMITED: FOR EXAMPLE, AS NOTED IN COUNSELOR DERWINSKI'S JUNE 10 TESTIMONY BEFORE THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE'S TRADE SUBCOMMITTEE, THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL UNDERGROUND TRAINING OF PASTORS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE SECURITY APPARATUS.

Q. Is it that there are no established working relationships between these groups and the state, and that the state security forces are therefore suspicious?

A. -- THIS IS BROADLY CORRECT, BUT THE ABSENCE OF WORKING RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN ONLY ONE FACTOR IN STIMULATING THE SUSPICION OF THE SECURITY APPARATUS. IT HAS BEEN OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ROMANIAN OFFICIALS THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE TENETS PREACHED BY THESE GROUPS. HARASSMENT AND SUSPICION HAVE ALSO BEEN PRODUCTS OF A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL ATHEISM AND THE LINKS BETWEEN ITS STRONG NATIONALISM AND THE ROMANIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH.

Q. Is it that these groups insist on the primacy of religious belief over state authority?

A. -- IN SOME CASES, YES, TO SOME EXTENT.

-- AS NOTED, THERE IS MISUNDERSTANDING AMONG ROMANIAN OFFICIALS OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH VARIOUS GROUPS INSIST ON THE PRIMACY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF. THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS, HOWEVER, SOME SERIOUS PROBLEMS OVER SOCIAL POLICY WITH SOME OF THE GROUPS: FOR EXAMPLE, WITH JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES OVER SATURDAY RELIGIOUS SERVICES, REFUSAL TO MAKE CIVIL PLEDGES OF ALLEGIANCE,

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AND OVER SENDING CHILDREN TO STATE SCHOOLS.

Q. Is it that these groups engage in political activity and public religious meetings?

A. -- NONE OF THESE GROUPS ENGAGES, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE AMERICAN SENSE OF THE TERM.

-- AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE AUTHORITIES' UNEASE WITH THESE GROUPS' ACTIVITIES IS MORE BASED ON THEIR DEGREE OF PROMINENCE THAN ON THE FACT OF THEIR MEETING IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE. MANY OF CONGREGATIONS OF UNRECOGNIZED DENOMINATIONS MEET REGULARLY IN DESIGNATED, BUT NOT OFFICIALLY-LICENSED, PLACES OF WORSHIP WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT HINDRANCE.

B. Poland

1. Poland has now been approved for membership in the IMF and will soon become eligible for IMF credits. Great Britain and West Germany have recently extended Poland trade credits for the first time since 1981.

-- What purpose is served by the continuation of U.S. sanctions against Poland (no MFN, no new credits), at this time?

-- Why are we continuing sanctions against Poland when the President has removed sanctions against the Soviet Union and improved dialogue, exchanges and contacts with the Soviet Union?

-- Why, at a time when the President is requesting MFN extension for the Government of Romania, which has the worst human rights record in Eastern Europe by your own testimony, do we have sanctions in place blocking MFN for Poland, which still has the most open society in Eastern Europe even after the events of 1981?

-- THE SANCTIONS WERE IMPOSED AS A SPECIFIC RESPONSE TO MARTIAL LAW AND THE OUTLAWING OF SOLIDARITY. THEY ARE INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND THE POLISH PEOPLE. THEY ARE MAINTAINED BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS

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IN THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS. IN FACT, THE NUMBERS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS HAVE INCREASED RECENTLY. THE DECISION BY GREAT BRITIAN, WEST GERMANY AND BELGIUM TO PROVIDE VERY MODEST CREDITS TIED TO POLISH IMPORTS FROM THOSE COUNTRIES, REFLECTS THEIR CONCERN FOR THE POLISH DEBT SITUATION AND THEIR INTEREST IN DEVELOPING TRADE TIES WITH POLAND, AND NOT THEIR APPROVAL OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN POLAND.

-- OUR INTEREST IN DEVELOPING U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE REFLECTS THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO PROGRESS IN ALL AREAS OF OUR AGENDA WITH MOSCOW: ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS. WE HAVE DEVOTED EFFORTS TO DEVELOP PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE AND OTHER EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WITH REGARD TO POLAND, THERE IS A LARGE PRIVATELY-SPONSORED EXCHANGE OF POLISH SCIENTISTS, ARTISTS, EDUCATORS AND BUSINESSMEN IN KEEPING WITH OUR POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR THE POLISH PEOPLE.

-- THE YEAR-BY-YEAR REVIEW OF MFN FOR ROMANIA AND HUNGARY IS GOVERNED BY THE JACKSON-VANIK CRITERIA REGARDING EMIGRATION PRACTICES. WE ALSO CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF THE REVIEW IN ADVANCING OTHER U.S. INTERESTS, INCLUDING IMPROVED PERFORMANMCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. BY CONTRAST, POLAND IS NOT ONE OF THOSE COUNTRIES SUBJECTED TO THE YEARLY RENEWAL PROCESS AND WOULD NOT BE IF MFN WERE RESTORED. OUR DECISION TO SUSPEND MFN FOR POLAND WAS THE RESULT OF A BROADER RANGE OF CONSIDERATIONS, PRINCIPALLY INVOLVING THE IMPOSTION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE OUTLAWING OF SOLIDARITY, AND OUR OBJECTIVE WAS TO USE THE MFN SANCTION TO ENCOURAGE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

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IV. EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Q. It is said that the Turkish Cypriots are contemplating one of several moves if progress does not occur: establish a new currency for the north; obtain recognition by some Muslim countries; open up the dead town of Varosha; or sign a defense pact with Turkey regularizing a Turkish troop presence What is the U.S. saying to the Turks and Turkish Cypriots about such moves? Is it accurate that Prime Minister Ozal will visit northern Cyprus soon? Do we support or oppose such a visit?

A. --We have urged both Greek and Turkish Cypriots not to take any steps which could complicate the effort to achieve a just and lasting settlement. Regarding the specific measures mentioned above, we have made clear our view to the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey that taking such steps would only make a negotiated settlement that much harder to accomplish.

--Turkish Prime Minister Ozal visited northern Cyprus July 2-4. We expressed concern over the possible impact the visit could have on the UN Secretary General's initiative.

--During the visit, Ozal focused primarily on economic matters and steps the Turkish Cypriots should take to achieve greater economic growth.

--During the July 2-4 period the checkpoints between northern and southern Cyprus were closed by the Greek Cypriots in response to the Ozal visit. On July 4 the Turkish Cypriots closed the checkpoints and stated the measure was taken in reaction to the Greek Cypriot action and statements made by the UN Spokesman and others critical of the visit. On July 12 the Turkish Cypriots re-opened the checkpoints.

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V. WESTERN EUROPE

Q: The press has reported significant European disagreement with the Administration's decision to move away from the limits set by the SALT II Treaty. The allies have stressed the importance of holding to SALT II. Some comments include:

-- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher: "We regard it as important that the SALT II agreement continue to be observed by both sides."

-- West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher: The two sides must adhere to SALT II "as long as we have nothing better."

-- Based on these remarks and others, do you believe you have the support of the allies on the Administration's decision on SALT II?

-- How do you account for this response from key allies like West Germany and Britain which have conservative governments?

A: -- AMBASSADORS NITZE AND ROWNY CONSULTED WITH OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN EUROPE AND ASIA PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON INTERIM RESTRAINT. ALLIED COMMENTS WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DEVELOPING THE FINAL DECISION. WE KNEW THAT CERTAIN SECTORS OF ALLIED PUBLIC OPINION, AS IN THE U.S., WOULD OBJECT TO SOME ELEMENTS IN THE DECISION.

-- OUR ALLIES HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS AN OBLIGATION TO OBSERVE THE SALT PROVISIONS AND HAVE NOTED THE CONTINUING RECORD OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS. IN ADDITION, I WOULD POINT OUT THAT MANY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAVE ISSUED STATEMENTS CRITICIZING THE SOVIET RECORD OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH SALT II AND OTHER AGREEMENTS AND ASKING FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION. THE OBJECTIVE NOW IS TO GET SOMETHING BETTER -- AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT THAT ACHIEVES DEEP, EQUITABLE, AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS.

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Q: Are negotiations on the status of U.S. bases and military personnel in Spain to begin on July 10 as reported?

In May, the Spanish State Secretary for Defense, Eduardo Serra, reportedly said,

> "Speaking of any kind of reduction of U.S. presence does not mean closing bases. These are two different matters. At best we could talk about bases ceasing to be more or less of joint use, but not about bases being closed."

Does this accurately state Spanish policy on the bases?

Is Spain not going to seek actual closure of a base in Spain, or is that still an open quesion?

Has Spain changed its position on this issue?

A: SECRETARY SHULTZ AND SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER FERNANDEZ ORDONEZ AGREED IN THEIR MAY 27 MEETING THAT US AND SPANISH REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS FOR RENEWING OUR BILATERAL BASING RIGHTS AGREEMENT ON JULY 10. THIS MEETING PROCEEDED AS SCHEDULED.

THE JOINT US-SPANISH STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 10, 1985 STATES THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ADDRESS THE PHASED REDUCTION OF THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN SPAIN BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION BY THE SPANISH ARMED FORCES OF SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITES CURRENTLY UNDERTAKEN BY US FORCES IN SPAIN WHILE MAINTAINING CURRENT GLOBAL AND BILATERAL SECURITY LEVELS.

AT THE JULY 10 MEETING, BOTH SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THESE PRINCIPLES. THE SPANISH SIDE PRESENTED ITS PROPOSALS FOR THE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN SPAIN BALANCED BY INCREASED SUPPORT AND COOPERATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. THE UNITED

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STATES OUTLINED THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF US FORCES IN SPAIN TO THE SECURITY OF SPAIN AND THE WEST AND ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLES AND MISSIONS THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN PRESENT LEVELS OF SECURITY.

THE MEETING JULY 10 WAS BUT THE FIRST STEP OF WHAT WILL BE A LENGTHY NEGOTIATION PROCESS LEADING TO THE RENEWAL OF THE US-SPANISH AGREEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP, DEFENSE, AND COOPERATION, WHICH NOW EXPIRES IN 1988. THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN HAVE NOTED THAT ANY CHANGES WILL BE BASED ON MUTUAL AGREEMENT AND HAVE REPEATEDLY REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE CORDIAL RELATIONS WHICH EXIST BETWEEN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES AND OF INCREASING THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THEIR COOPERATION.

Q. On June 4 Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker suggested that West Germany should reduce its interest rates to promote greater economic growth in West Germany and Europe. So far, the West Germans have firmly opposed the idea of inflating their economy.
--Do you believe West Germany may change its position on the issue?
--Why are the West Germans so reluctant to take measures that might promote a faster rate of economic growth?
--Is it realistic for the U.S. to center on one country in Western Europe to promote both economic growth and stabilization of exchange rates?
--How does this policy differ from the policy during the Carter Administration that spoke of West Germany as the "locomotive" for Europe's economic performance?

A.--Officials of the Federal Republic of Germany have indicated that their emphasis is on budgetary discipline to reduce the public spending deficit in order to improve the business climate as the best means to promote economic growth and employment. In response to suggestions that they take further steps to stimulate growth, German officials have responded that steps have been taken (e.g. a two-stage tax cut) and that the growth of West German domestic demand, together with interest

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rate and currency rate trends outside the FRG, suggests that additional stimulative steps at this time are unnecessary and could run the risk of igniting inflation. We are aware of no current change in this position.

Because the countries of Western Europe are allies and major trading partners, the United States Government retains a keen interest the state of their economies. The Federal Republic plays an important role both as our trading partner and as a leader in the European Economic Community. While our exports to Germany last year were valued at approximately $11 billion we still had a trade deficit of almost $8 billion. The German economy is the third largest of the industrialized democracies and produces 33% of the European Community GNP. These data explain, in part, why the USG gives such close attention to the FRG. But that justifiable attention is not the same as over-dependence or pressure.

We have been discussing the international economic scene in several multilateral fora such as the Economic Summit and the Organinzation for Economic Cooperation and Development. In these settings we have consistently stressed the need for appropriate market-oriented actions by all, rather than looking to one country to provide a panacea. In the case of the Federal Republic we believe its economy has the potential for stable growth at a rate greater than its current performance. Moreover, as a country with a large--and growing--trade and current account surpluses, it has a particular responsibility for helping to reduce external imbalances among the major countries.

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Q: Commerce Secretary Baldrige announced June 9th action under the Pelly Amendment against Norway in response to commercial whaling by Norway. This action could lead to an embargo of Norwegian fish products. Does the United States plan trade sanctions against Norway? What is the next step with Norway on this matter, or are sanctions automatic at this point?

A: UNDER THE PELLY AMENDMENT, WITHIN 60 DAYS OF CERTIFICATION THE PRESIDENT MUST INFORM CONGRESS WHETHER HE HAS IMPOSED SANCTIONS AGAINST THE IMPORT OF FISH PRODUCTS FROM THE COUNTRY CONCERNED OR, IF HE HAS NOT, WHY NOT. THE PRESIDENT STILL HAS NOT MADE HIS DECISION ON THIS MATTER (AS OF JULY 17). SECRETARY BALDRIGE WILL ADVISE THE PRESIDENT ON THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO HIM.

ON JULY 3 THE GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY ANNOUNCED THAT IT WILL CONTINUE WITH THIS YEAR'S WHALE HUNT WITHIN THE QUOTA IT HAS ESTABLISHED (350 WHALES FROM THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC MINKE WHALE STOCK AND 50 WHALES FROM THE GREENLAND STOCK), AND THAT IT ALSO WILL ESTABLISH A QUOTA FOR COMMERCIAL WHALING IN 1987 WHICH WILL BE SMALLER THAN THE 1986 QUOTA, BUT THAT AFTER THE 1987 SEASON NORWAY WILL NOT ENGAGE IN COMMERCIAL WHALING, SUBJECT TO RECONSIDERATION IN 1990. (NORWAY RESERVES THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN SCIENTIFIC WHALING TO SUPPORT ITS CONTINUING EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE SIZE AND STATUS OF THE MINKE STOCKS.) NORWAY ALSO SAID IT WILL ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF SCIENTISTS TO REVIEW THE CONFLICTING RESEARCH FINDINGS CONCERNING MINKE WHALE STOCKS. SECRETARY BALDRIGE'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT WILL TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE JULY 3 ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY.

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Q: Why have U.S. negotiations with the Norwegians on this issue not succeeded (they have been going on since 1982)?

A: IN SHORT, OUR NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED BECAUSE OF A BASIC DISAGREEMENT WITH THE NORWEGIANS ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED.

THE NORWEGIANS DISAGREE WITH OUR POSITION THAT, IN SUPPORT OF THE DECISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION FOR A MORATORIUM ON ALL COMMERCIAL WHALING, THERE SHOULD BE NO HUNTING OF MINKE WHALES. THE NORWEGIANS ALSO ARGUE THAT THERE ARE SMALL COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN NORWAY WITH ECONOMIES DEPENDENT IN PART ON EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME PROVIDED BY COMMERCIAL WHALING.

IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS SINCE 1982 WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONVINCE THE NORWEGIANS TO STOP COMMERCIAL WHALING IMMEDIATELY. THE ADMINISTRATION'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON JUNE 9 OF THE CERTIFICATION OF NORWAY UNDER THE PELLY AMENDMENT, HOWEVER, WAS FOLLOWED ON JULY 3 BY A STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY THAT NORWAY WOULD STOP COMMERCIAL WHALING AFTER 1987.

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VI. TERRORISM

1. There were reports that, because licenses were granted to five American oil companies to continue their operations in Libya after February 1, the U.S. government had difficulty getting European nations to cooperate in economic sanctions against Libya.

--Are these reports correct?

We do not comment on the substance of diplomatic exchanges.

--To what degree did the licenses impede our efforts to gain European cooperation?

The licenses did not in any way impede the Europeans from reducing their economic contacts with Libya. We do not believe that the Europeans ever doubted the sincerity of our own efforts to eliminate any U.S. economic contribution, even inadvertent, to Libya. In any case, we have now required U.S. companies to terminate all operations in Libya as of June 30. This will allow us to focus prospectively on what we and the Europeans need to do together.

--Is there any substance to the complaints by the Europeans?

--That is, did the permitted activity in fact significantly strengthen the Libyan economy? How much did the oil company operations aid Libya compared with the activities of the Europeans?

The licenses were granted to allow the companies additional time to negotiate a withdrawal which would not provide a financial windfall to Qadhafi. We therefore do not believe that the licenses served to "strengthen the Libyan economy". The Europeans, for reasons of proximity and history, have always been far more heavily involved in commercial relations with Libya than the United States.

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--Or are the Europeans just rationalizing their position?

I would not care to label the European actions.

--Now that the President has stated that the licenses in question will not be extended beyond June 30 (and the House has passed legislation mandating the licenses' expiration), what further acts of cooperation with our economic sanctions can we expect from the Europeans?

We consult frequently with the Europeans, urging that additional steps be taken. European economic contacts with Libya have already been sharply curtailed, while Libyan petroleum sales to a number of countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands are down. This has been accompanied by a rapid drop in the number of Europeans, including Italians, working in Libya.

We are also contemplating a further ban on imports of petroleum products refined in any country from Libyan crude. This step would follow on our 1982 ban on Libyan crude oil and our 1985 ban on petroleum products refined in Libya. We will consult with the Europeans on this new step, and, as in the past, strongly urge them to cooperate and to take similar measures.

. The Administration was very interested in assuring that European nations do not "fill in" behind Americans departing Libya, and we received certain assurances that their nationals would not "fill in".

--Which European states have told us they would not allow their nationals to 'fill in"?

--What steps have they taken to carry out their assurances? Are we satisfied with their actions?

--What more needs to be done?

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We are pleased by the pledges of our allies that they will not undercut U.S. measures. We have consulted with our allies over a number of allegations of fill-in and have found the countries quite cooperative in attempting to carry out their commitments. At this time, I can say that we see no evidence of any significant 'fill in' by European companies. Additionally, American companies can only dispose of their assets in Libya to 'Libyan persons' or by exporting them from Libya if sold to non-Libyans. This is meant to prevent the sale of such assets to non-Libyans for use in Libya. We believe that these measures are adequate to deal with the 'fill in' problem.

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APPENDIX 2

BIOGRAPHY OF HON. ROZANNE RIDGWAY

Rozanne L. Ridgway was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs on Friday, July 19, 1985. From 1982 until assuming her present position, she served as American Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic. A career diplomat, Ambassador Ridgway has also served as Counselor of the Department of State, Ambassador to Finland, and Ambassador for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs.

Ambassador Ridgway was born in St. Paul, Minnesota. She received a B.A. from Hamline University in St. Paul, where she subsequently received an Honorary LL.D. Ambassador Ridgway began her Foreign Service career in the Department of State working as an information specialist. Her early assignments abroad were as personnel officer at the Embassy in Manila and as visa officer at the Consulate General in Palermo.

In September 1964, she was assigned to the Department of State as an international relations officer, until her posting to Oslo in June 1967 as political officer. Ambassador Ridgway returned to the Department in 1970, working first as Ecuadorean Desk Officer and then as Deputy Director for Policy Planning and Coordination in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. She was Deputy Chief of Mission in Nassau from 1973 until his appointment in 1975 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs. In February 1976, she confirmed as Ambassador for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs.

She served as Ambassador to Finland from 1977 to 1980, when she became Counselor for the Department. After a period of service as a special negotiator assigned to the Secretary's staff, she was sworn in as Ambassador to the GDR in October 1982.

Ambassador Ridgway received the Department's Superior Honor Award in 1966, 1975 and 1981, the Meritorious Honor Award in 1970, and the William Jump Meritorious Award for Exemplary Achievement in Public Administration. In April 1977, she received the annual national award of the National Fisheries Institute and in October 1982 the Joseph C. Wilson Award for Achievement in International Affairs.

Ambassador Ridgway holds the rank of Career Minister. She is married to Captain Theodore Deming, U.S. Coast Guard.

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